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This research looks at the issue of risk tolerance, and analyzes its role in U.S. Army 
Special Forces (SF). More specifically, it assesses the degree to which senior members of 
an organization allow junior members to make autonomous decisions, and argues that the 
unconventional warfare (UW) mission and nature of SF call for a higher degree of risk 
tolerance than is seen in conventional forces. 
A longitudinal case study of the conflict in Afghanistan shows that in 2001 SF 
had a “long leash” to allow for autonomy and flexibility, which was necessary to succeed 
in a UW environment. However, by 2006, the leash was shortened and more control 
measures were implemented. While a “short leash” may be appropriate for a conventional 
battlefield, it adversely impacts SF effectiveness in a UW environment. 
The three main reasons that induce risk aversion in SF leaders are exogenous 
political factors, organizational considerations including chain of command, and 
organizational culture, which is reinforced by the current Army officer evaluation system. 
This analysis suggests that the deleterious impact of these factors needs to be addressed 
in SF. 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  THE PUZZLE ..............................................................................................................1 
A.  INTRODUCTION............................................................................................1 
B.  BORROWING TOOLS FROM ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ........................1 
C.  APPLIED TO SPECIAL FORCES IN THE UNCONVENTIONAL 
WARFARE MISSION.....................................................................................4 
D.  THE DANGER OF RISK AVERSION IN U.S. ARMY SPECIAL 
FORCES ...........................................................................................................7 
E.  DELEGATING AUTHORITY TO SUBORDINATES: 
THEORETICAL APPROACHES .................................................................9 
1.  Decision Theory and Organizational Theory ..................................10 
2.  The Role of Incentives .......................................................................11 
F.  THE PRINCIPAL–AGENT APPROACH TO ANALYZING THE 
PUZZLE..........................................................................................................12 
G.  ROADMAP .....................................................................................................15 
II.  RISK TOLERANCE AND SUCCESS IN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE ..17 
A.  THE ESSENTIAL ARGUMENT OF RISK ...............................................17 
1.  The Principal ......................................................................................18 
2.  The Agent ............................................................................................19 
3.  Assumptions .......................................................................................19 
4.  Working and Shirking .......................................................................20 
5.  Preferences and Information ............................................................21 
6.  Monitoring and Control Mechanisms ..............................................24 
B.  SPECIAL FORCES AND GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES: 
ATTRIBUTES AND ENVIRONMENTS ....................................................26 
1.  General Purpose Forces: Unit Attributes ........................................27 
2.  Special Forces: Unit Attributes.........................................................28 
3.  The Conventional Warfighting Environment .................................29 
4.  The Unconventional Warfighting Environment .............................30 
C.  THE ASSESSMENT ......................................................................................31 
D.  CASE SELECTION.......................................................................................33 
III.  THE CASE OF CHANGING RISK TOLERANCE IN AFGHANISTAN ..........37 
A.  SF MISSIONS IN AFGHANISTAN IN 2001 ..............................................38 
1.  Background and Environment .........................................................38 
2.  The Units and Mission .......................................................................39 
3.  The Principal and the Agent .............................................................40 
4.  Preferences and Information ............................................................40 
5.  Monitoring and Control Mechanisms ..............................................41 
6.  Analysis ...............................................................................................42 
B.  SF MISSIONS IN AFGHANISTAN IN 2006 ..............................................44 
1.  Background and Environment .........................................................44 
2.  The Units and Mission .......................................................................45 
 viii
3.  The Principal and the Agent .............................................................45 
4.  Preferences and Information ............................................................46 
5.  Monitoring and Control Mechanisms ..............................................49 
6.  Analysis ...............................................................................................52 
IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS ...................................................57 
A.  SUMMARY ....................................................................................................57 
B.  RECOMMENDATIONS ...............................................................................58 
1.  Exogenous Factors .............................................................................59 
2.  Organizational Considerations .........................................................60 
3.  Organizational Culture .....................................................................61 
a.  Officer Evaluation System ......................................................62 
b.  Multiple Command Structures ...............................................63 
C.  CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................63 
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................65 




LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ABP  Afghan Border Police  
ACOM above center of mass 
ADCON administrative control 
ADP  Army Doctrine Publication  
ANA  Afghan National Army 
ANP  Afghan National Police 
AO area of operation 
AOB alternate operating base 
AR  Army Regulation 
ASF  Afghan Security Force 
ATV all-terrain vehicle 
BC battalion commander 
CENTCOM Central Command 
CJSOTF  Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force 
COL Colonel 
COM center of mass 
CONOP concept of operations 
CSA  Chief of Staff, Army 
DA direct action  
DOD Department of Defense 
FID foreign internal defense 
FSO METL  full spectrum operations mission essential task list 
GCC Geographic Combatant Command 
GEN General 
GPF  General Purpose Forces 
HQ headquarters 
IED improvised explosive device 
JP  Joint Publication 
JSOA joint special operations area 
K2 Karshi-Khanabad Airbase, Uzbekistan 
 x
KSA  knowledge, skills, and abilities 
NSS National Security Strategy 
OEF Operation Enduring Freedom 
OER officer evaluation report 
OPCON operational control 
QRF quick reaction force 
RC regional command 
SCO U.S. Embassy Security Cooperation Office 
SECDEF Secretary of Defense 
SF  Special Forces  
SFG(A) Special Forces Group (Airborne) 
SFODA  Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha 
SITREP situation report 
SOF  Special Operations Forces 
SOP standard operating procedures 
SOTF special operations task force 
SWTG  Special Warfare Training Group 
TF  task force 
UAV unmanned aerial vehicle 
USAJFKSWCS U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School 
UW unconventional warfare  
VSP village stability platform 
VTC video-telephone conference 
  
 1
I. THE PUZZLE 
“The characteristic American resentment of authority, dating from the 
birth of the United States, has undoubtedly influenced command policy in 
their armed forces and has led to a considerable measure of independence 
and delegated responsibility at every level.” 
— A British Officer Commenting on American Forces  
in the Second World War1 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Special Forces (SF) have become prominent actors in the recent conflicts in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. Over twelve years of warfighting, Army SF have been called upon 
countless times to conduct complex operations (including, but not limited to, killing or 
capturing high-value targets) in support of conventional “battlespace” owners. While this 
has produced a generation of SF officers with arguably the most combat experience since 
the organization’s inception, one disturbing ramification seems to be the over-
centralization of command that has been engendered in the organization in the last 
decade. The purpose of this research is two-fold. The first purpose is to introduce a novel 
set of tools from microeconomic theory to analyze the roles of risk tolerance and degree 
of centralization in optimizing organizations to their environment. The second purpose is 
to use these tools to explore the evolution of centralization within SF over the course of 
the Afghanistan conflict. The result of the analysis is to provide recommendations for the 
SF enterprise in the wake of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, in light of emerging 
guidance from senior military leadership.2 
B. BORROWING TOOLS FROM ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
To shed new light on the role of centralization in Army Special Forces, we can 
perhaps fruitfully borrow models of private firms to assist in our understanding of 
                                                 
1 Direct quote from a British observer during World War II, cited in Thomas Ricks, The Generals: 
American Military Command from World War II to Today (New York: Penguin Press, 2012), 82.  
2 See CDRUSASOC’s vision for SF in “ARSOF 2022,” which includes a focus on special warfare that 
centers on the UW mission. 
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military organizations. The owner of a firm, while representing and guiding the 
organization, does not do every task for the firm; instead, it is an entity filled with 
managers, workers, suppliers, and supervisors.3 In these organizations, tasks are 
delegated down to appropriate levels for action. While authority to accomplish tasks can 
be delegated, responsibility usually is not. The senior leader, or supervisor, is still 
responsible for his junior leaders, or subordinates, accomplishing various tasks (even 
when the supervisor holds his subordinates responsible for the success or failure of any 
task). Therefore, delegating authority can be problematic, especially when the supervisor 
cannot directly observe the behavior of a subordinate.4 
An organization’s level of centralization and decentralization is determined by the 
level to which decision making authority is delegated.5 Whether an organization is more 
centralized or more decentralized not only determines the level at which decision making 
authority is located, it also determines how much “control” supervisors feel they need to 
impose on subordinates to ensure they are accomplishing their tasks to the standard 
required by that supervisor. For the purposes of my research, I equate decentralization 
and junior leader/subordinate “autonomy” as one and the same. The more decision 
making authority the junior leader/subordinate has, the more autonomy he has. 
Decentralization, of course, is necessary in some circumstances. Some 
organizations in certain environments will succeed better when decision making authority 
is decentralized to the lowest level appropriate to the situation. Some types of 
organizations need and allow autonomous behavior by junior leaders. For example, a 
bank loan officer has the authority to deny or approve loans based on his or her individual 
judgment, which would result in either a payoff or a loss for the bank. Similarly, Wall 
Street traders have potential to lose large amounts of their clients’ money due to junior 
leader decision making. These organizations are structured to optimize performance by 
inducing an appropriate degree of initiative in junior decision makers.  
                                                 
3 Oliver E. Williamson, Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York: Free Press, 1985), 15. 
4 Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort, Theory of Incentives: Principal-Agent Problem 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 11.  
5 Henry Mintzberg, Organizational Design: Fashion or Fit? (Boston: Harvard Business Review, 
1981), 15. 
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Incentives have a great deal of importance when one attempts to understand the 
interaction between entities within the organization. Incentives are important when an 
organization wants to decentralize because subordinates will respond to incentives (the 
reward/punishment system established by the organization’s leadership and culture). If 
subordinates are not incentivized to make autonomous decisions in a decentralized 
organization, then they will not. Similarly, if supervisors are not incentivized to allow 
subordinates to make autonomous decisions, then they will be less inclined to allow it. 
This implies a certain level of risk for senior leaders/supervisors to provide for junior 
leader autonomy and decentralized decision making authority. Risk, of course, must be 
managed and mitigated. 
To build my argument, I apply an informal principal agent (PA) model to the 
military, in particular to SF in an unconventional warfare (UW) environment. Principal 
agent theory from microeconomics was developed to help private firms in the business 
community figure out how corporate leaders should manage subordinates, but PA theory 
helps illustrate any “task delegation” scenario in any hierarchical organization. PA looks 
specifically at incentives, from both the principal’s and agent’s points of view, and how 
those incentives must be tailored to specific situations. Many PA models utilize formal 
analyses to demonstrate how both sides (principal and agent) can find equilibrium when 
faced with problems (such as preference differences and information asymmetry) that can 
contribute to increased risk aversion, which I will explain in detail in Chapter II. 
However, here I build an informal PA model, which I adapt to SF conducting their UW 
mission. 
The PA model presented herein helps to highlight the conditions under which 
leaders may feel the need to tightly control their subordinates. While, some control is 
necessary at every level of the military, the appropriate level of control for certain 
environments is what I am attempting to illustrate, highlight, and clarify. I call this 
control a “leash.” The principal always has a leash attached to the agent; the principal 
controls the agent with this leash. However, the principal has a choice on how tight the 
leash needs to be. The principal can hold the agent on a “short leash” or a “long leash.” 
The longer the leash, the more leeway or autonomy the junior leader enjoys; the more 
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decentralized decision making authority rests at his level. However, the most important 
factor to consider is the level of risk assumed by the principal when he allows a “long 
leash.” A long leash is risky for the principal because the agent may make poor decisions, 
which can result in mission failure. My thesis focuses, therefore, on identifying the 
situations when a short leash or a long leash is appropriate. 
C. APPLIED TO SPECIAL FORCES IN THE UNCONVENTIONAL 
WARFARE MISSION 
The U.S. military traditionally has a hierarchical and centralized control structure 
and many aspects of a “machine bureaucracy,” or highly rigid organization that is suited 
to a stable and simple environment,6 as it was essentially designed to engage in large 
scale attrition warfare, such as was conducted in World War II.7 When conducting such 
heavy force-on-force engagements, there is a limited range of the “possible” and it is easy 
to create a rigid organizational apparatus of purpose-built subordinate tasks/roles that do 
not vary widely. A “short leash” is appropriate in this scenario because leaders need to 
synchronize and control maneuver forces. This may be the best way to maintain control 
and efficiency in such an operational environment, but it does not respond well to rapid 
change or uncertainty in the environment. 
Unfortunately, the non-state actors that characterize the current threat landscape 
do not employ large-scale maneuver forces that most state militaries are designed to 
counter. Furthermore, the nature of unconventional warfare creates an external 
environment that is both complex and unstable—and the units assigned to operate in 
them should be designed accordingly. In such a scenario, a “long leash” is more 
appropriate and junior officers should have a higher degree of autonomy to make 
decisions. If, however, few incentives exist for senior officers to allow such behavior, a 
junior officer learns to not make quick decisions and the result is a misfit between the 
organizational design of a unit, its mission and the external threat environment. 
                                                 
6 Henry Mintzberg, Organizational Design: Fashion or Fit? (Boston: Harvard Business Review, 
1981), 7. 
7 Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare (Monterey, CA: 
U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2006), 99. 
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The UW mission deviates from a conventional mission because it is vague, fuzzy, 
and complex. UW requires a dedicated effort in a prolonged indirect engagement with the 
population of the subject state. Doctrine defines UW as “activities to enable a resistance 
movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying 
power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a 
denied area.”8 Doctrine also states that these types of missions carry significant risk and 
are usually politically sensitive. An enormous amount of planning goes into any UW 
operation. Doctrine also classifies UW as being “characterized by innovative design” 
because the method of execution must be creative. SF teams have to convince an 
insurgent movement to work with them and this would require quick reaction and 
decision making on the ground.9 
Through my research I will show that SF are selected and trained to operate in 
this vague, fuzzy, and complex environment but they need a longer leash to be 
successful. Further, I argue that UW is a mission that requires a higher level of risk 
tolerance of the leadership in units conducting that mission. SF is a part of the U.S. 
military that is supposed to be best suited for uncertainty and complex unconventional 
warfare environments. Though all U.S. military officers may be of relatively high quality, 
SF officers have gone through a rigorous selection process and have received specialized 
training and education for this specific mission and environment. 
However, as I will show through empirical analysis presented below, the war in 
Afghanistan may have pushed SF into a being a “short-leash” organization. A 
longitudinal case study of the conflict in Afghanistan shows that in 2001 SF had a “long 
leash” and exercised autonomy and flexibility, which was necessary to succeed in an UW 
environment. However, by 2006, the leash was shortened and more control measures 
were implemented. While a “short leash” may be appropriate for a conventional 
battlefield, it negatively impacts SF effectiveness in a UW environment. 
                                                 
8 U.S. Dept. of Defense, JP 3–05 Special Operations, II-9. 
9 U.S. Dept. of Defense, ADP 3–05 Special Operations, 9. 
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SF’s role in the future is likely to be heavily weighted toward UW missions and it 
will need to regain its “long leash” mentality to work well.10 I feel this is an important 
area of study because it is extremely difficult to succeed in a UW campaign without 
being decentralized. In a UW environment, a headquarters responsible for command and 
control (C2) of subordinate units has a very difficult time trying to analyze all 
information available. This is due to the vast nature of UW. Time, distance, individual 
relationships, rapport, and tribal/cultural understanding are but a few of the variables that 
need to be understood in a UW environment. In this type of environment, no one is better 
suited to understand and analyze the information than the agent on the ground. In many 
cases, he only needs a narrow band of information (his slice) to be successful. 
I argue that current designs for C2 of conventional military operations are 
incompatible with C2 requirements for UW. When making decisions, U.S. military 
leaders always assess risk and try to mitigate any “risk to the mission” or “risk to the 
force.” How much risk a leader is willing to assume is based on his analysis of the 
situation (both enemy and friendly) and his mission, among many other factors. During 
conventional military operations, a leader does not need to place himself or the mission at 
risk through decentralized authority because he keeps his subordinates on a “short leash” 
through various control mechanisms. However, I argue that in order to be successful in a 
UW environment a leader must be willing to assume more risk by allowing subordinate 
autonomy and decentralization because, as I will show, these are critical for success in a 
UW environment. 
Unfortunately, I will also show that leaders in the military today have little 
incentive to allow such autonomy. My analysis shows that leaders are incentivized to 
assert more control and to be risk averse, because in recent operational environments a 
“failure” (such as friendly or civilian casualties) has weighed more heavily than a 
“success” (establishing a viable “village stability platform” (VSP) or garnering favor with 
indigenous leaders). I will show that this risk aversion to decentralization can hinder 
                                                 
10 See CDRUSASOC’s vision for SF in “ARSOF 2022,” which includes a focus on special warfare 
that centers on the UW mission. 
 7
mission accomplishment and the unit’s ability to successfully meet the nation’s political 
and military objectives.  
To succeed in a UW environment, we need adaptability and flexibility, but tight 
control and risk aversion hinder the achievement of mission success. Although the PA 
model is just a simplified representation of reality, its purpose is to help understand the 
concept of a leader’s risk tolerance level when assessing risk to the mission and troops 
when he is making decisions.  
D. THE DANGER OF RISK AVERSION IN U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES 
It is important to examine this puzzle and identify an appropriate level of risk 
tolerance that will allow SF to optimize its ability to conduct its mission as its UW duties 
expand. This thesis explores the argument that not allowing junior SF leaders the 
appropriate level of autonomy to make decisions can create organizational stagnation, 
reduce operational initiative, and result in a mismanaged human resources system within 
SF. In other words, risk aversion may develop a force unable to meet its operational 
requirements and needs. However, this thesis does not advocate the endorsement of risky 
or reckless behavior for its own sake; it is about the delegation of authority and accepting 
minimal oversight for operational effectiveness. This requires senior officers to accept 
more risk to produce potentially significant outcomes. 
Furthermore, the 38th Chief of Staff of the Army, General Raymond T. Odierno, 
recently published his guidance to all U.S. Army leaders. In it, he articulates his five 
priorities as the Army makes “changes to our institutions and processes to ensure that we 
are maximizing the limited resources available.” His first priority is the need for 
“adaptive Army leaders for a complex world.” He tells us that “[t]he unpredictability so 
prominent in the contemporary security environment will almost certainly remain a 
characteristic of the future” and “[i]n this challenging environment, it is essential that our 
Total Army…be ready to accomplish the range of military operations we are directed to 
perform.”11 The prescribed way to succeed in such an environment is through “mission 
command.” The definition itself requires seniors to “enable disciplined initiative” and 
                                                 
11 General Raymond T. Odierno, email message to author, October 16, 2013. 
 8
“empower agile and adaptive leaders.”12 To do so, commanders need to provide their 
subordinates with intent, purpose, desired end state, and above all, resources to 
accomplish the mission. Subordinates are called upon to exercise “disciplined initiative” 
and be flexible. The doctrine’s six principles of mission command include “build 
cohesive teams through mutual trust, create shared understanding, provide a clear 
commander’s intent, exercise disciplined initiative, use mission orders, and accept 
prudent risk.”13 When making decisions, military leaders always assess risk and try to 
mitigate any risk to the mission or to the force. The relevant question that emerges from 
this analysis concerns defining the prudent level of risk. If aversion to risk becomes too 
great, subordinates’ initiative is stymied—and the organization as a whole is unable to 
embody Odierno’s directive. If this is true of the Army as whole, it is far more so for SF.  
Decentralization is necessary in UW but there is a risk because the principal may 
have uncertainty over the quality of the agent. In this case, the principal can assume this 
risk to achieve mission success. Fortunately, the utilization of SF in such a scenario 
increases the chances of success in a UW effort because of the training and quality of SF 
“agents.” The SF organization was built precisely to produce such high quality agents. 
The organization needs a C2 structure to support these agents to accomplish the mission. 
When a principal knows the agent is of high quality, success in UW can be achieved 
relatively quickly and easily by assuming risk and decentralizing command and control. 
If, however, the agent is not of high quality then the path to success is longer because it 
will require more control imposed by the principal. 
I must acknowledge that decentralization and JO autonomy are necessary, but not 
sufficient, conditions to be successful in a UW campaign. This means that without 
decentralization, UW will most likely fail, but decentralization alone will not produce 
success. Many other factors are required but that discussion is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. Also, regarding scope, I am only applying the PA model to the UW mission for 
                                                 
12 U.S. Dept. of Defense, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6–0 Mission Command (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 2012), 1.  
13 U.S. Dept. of Defense, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6–0 Mission Command (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 2012), 2.  
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SF. Direct Action (DA), Special Reconnaissance (SR) and Foreign Internal Defense 
(FID) are also missions for SF but this thesis will only focus on UW.14 
The argument presented here is deductive. The necessity for higher risk tolerance 
in UW environments is a conclusion from the non-controversial premises presented. The 
case studies selected from Afghanistan generally serve the purpose of showing the 
evolution to lower risk tolerance within the SF organization. If this empirical analysis is 
valid, it shows a troubling mismatch between the trajectory of the organization and its 
future operating environment. 
The second half of this first chapter is a review of the literature concerning 
decisions, organizations, risk, and incentives. These concepts are important to understand 
because they all evolve to principal agent theory. Each of these concepts builds upon 
each other, which helps show why I choose principal agent theory to use as my model to 
illustrate the interaction of military leaders in a UW environment and the implications of 
their decisions.  
E. DELEGATING AUTHORITY TO SUBORDINATES: THEORETICAL 
APPROACHES  
A rich literature concerning leadership decisions, organizational design, 
incentives, uncertainty, and risk management has been developed in the past six decades 
to help understand this topic. Each wave of theory has built upon the previous. Decision 
theory, which formalized the analysis of risk through the use of the concept of utility to 
assign probabilities and values to alternatives, was introduced in the 1950s.15 Then 
organizational theory developed in the 1970s and 1980s to put the problem inside the 
“sociological/psychological” framework of actual organizations such as firms and 
bureaucracies. Finally, principal agent analysis, developed in the 1990s and 2000s, is an 
                                                 
14 U.S. Dept. of Defense, JP 3–22 Foreign Internal Defense, ix. defines FID as “participation by 
civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government 
or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, 
terrorism, and other threats to its security.” 
15 Duncan R. Luce, Individual Choice Behavior: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: John Wiley & 
Sons, 1959), 1. 
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update of decision theory, but actually maps the strategic interaction of the boss and the 
subordinate by utilizing a specialized form of game theory. I now discuss each in turn. 
1. Decision Theory and Organizational Theory 
Decision theory focuses on explaining how decisions are made and why leaders 
make optimal or unbiased decisions.16 One essential element of decision theory is how to 
manage uncertainty and risk. Risk management focuses on how to harness uncertainty. 
Hubbard and Bernstein provide excellent explanations of risk management practices in 
organizations. Hubbard provides an excellent critique of current, widely accepted, risk 
management techniques. He explains why the largely qualitative methods are flawed and 
proposes multiple alternative methods to improve the process of managing risk and 
harnessing uncertainty.17 Bernstein’s account of the history behind the practice of risk 
management and its evolution in history provides a solid explanation for why these types 
of practices are necessary for any organization to prosper.18 Also, Burton and Obel’s 
discussion of strategic organizational design uses contingency theory as a framework for 
decision modeling. They focus and discuss how to manage and assess risk. They explain 
how it is necessary for organizations and leaders to face and incorporate risk but reiterate 
that leaders must do it intelligently.19  
Organizational theory focuses on the internal dynamics of such entities, and seeks 
to ascertain which organizational designs optimize performance. There are different 
lenses that can be used to analyze organizations, such as viewing the structure, human 
                                                 
16 Chris Arney, Robert Bumcrot, Paul Campbell, Joseph Gallian, Frank Giordano, Rochelle Wilson 
Meyer, Michael Olinick, and Alan Tucker, “Chance: Decision Theory” in Principles and Practice of 
Mathematics (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1997), 539–550. Decision theory is a mathematical model 
system to help people make an optimal decision in extremely complex environments. It uses math to assign 
probabilities to each alternative present in any given situation. The decision maker then uses the 
mathematical model to choose the best alternative of the given set. This theory assumes that a rational actor 
will want to choose the alternative with the most utility or value. The theory is useful because it helps 
illuminate the differences in various alternatives that may not be visible otherwise.  
17 Douglas Hubbard, The Failure of Risk Management: Why It’s Broken and How To Fix It (Hoboken, 
NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2009), 3–4. 
18 Peter Bernstein, Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & 
Sons, 1998), 1–2. 
19 Richard M. Burton, and Borge Obel, Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: Developing 
Theory for Application 2nd Ed (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998), 107–124. 
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resource system, culture, and political viewpoints. March’s analysis of organizations 
centers on the system’s ability to either explore or exploit learning opportunities. His 
definition of exploration includes risk taking, innovation, and flexibility. His definition of 
exploitation includes efficiency, execution, and implementation. He believes that 
organizations will be suboptimal if they focus on one over the other too much, and 
organizations must strive to best balance these competing processes.20 Mintzberg 
provides an excellent explanation of how organizations are designed and how each of 
their parts must fit each other to maximize payoff. Mintzberg’s analysis of the five 
different organizational configurations, different coordination mechanisms, and the five 
different parts of an organization help illuminate how leaders should design their 
organizations for optimization in their individual environments.21 Daft’s explanation  
of organizational design is used to show how the environment (stable or unstable and 
simple or complex) influences an organization. Analyzing the environment where the 
organization exists is critical to find goodness of fit. Daft defines the organizational 
environment “as all elements that exist outside the boundary of the organization and have 
the potential to affect all of part of the organization.” Along the same lines, Daft’s 
discussion on how to measure goal achievement (mission success) by using different 
approaches (goal, resource based, internal process, or stakeholder) is important.22 These 
approaches, though insightful, fail to focus on the role of incentives and monitoring 
between superior and subordinate. We now turn to authors who specifically analyze the 
interaction between people and why they do what they do.  
2. The Role of Incentives 
North discusses the role of institutions within an economic development 
framework and how they change in relation to the incentive structure of the economy. 
Incentives drive change and development. North also discusses how institutional 
                                                 
20 James March, “Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning,” Organization Science 2, 
no. 1 (1991), 71–87. 
21 Mintzberg, Organizational Design, 2–12. 
22 Richard Daft, Essentials of Organization Theory and Design (University of New Hampshire: South-
Western Thomson Learning, 2003), 82. 
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development could result in a path-dependent pattern.23 Schein explores the role of 
incentives in organizations, which he explains are more than simple extrinsic rewards like 
a monetary bonus, but include intrinsic rewards that will depend on the individual.24 Kerr 
does an excellent job articulating the problem when there is a difference between what 
managers want and what individuals are rewarded for. An example Kerr uses to 
emphasize his point is the difference between the incentives of a World War II soldier 
and a Vietnam soldier. A soldier in the Second World War knew he was fighting until the 
war was over. The Vietnam soldier knew he had to survive for his tour of duty (12 
months). The World War II soldier had incentives to fight hard so that the war may be 
won earlier whereas the Vietnam soldier had incentives to survive and get through his 
tour, regardless of how much effort he put into the war.25 
The theories identified in this literature review highlight how organizations and 
leaders should act, depending on their mission and environment. Common to all is that a 
senior official may be able to induce behavior and get what he wants from a subordinate. 
If the incentive of senior leaders is to not reward autonomy, then the culture of the 
organization will reflect it. This could result in a mismatch for an organization that exists 
in an unstable and complex environment.  
F. THE PRINCIPAL–AGENT APPROACH TO ANALYZING THE PUZZLE 
To better illuminate the interrelationship of theory and practice, this thesis 
incorporates microeconomics in an attempt to discuss the nature of how rational actors 
deal with their subordinates. Laffont and Martimort explain the “principal-agent 
problem” and how the incentive structure of an organization is central to designing how 
principals (or leaders) get their agents (or subordinates) to act the way they want them to. 
They explain how leaders should create an optimal contract with subordinates that details 
how rewards are earned. Rational actors make decisions for reasons that fit with their 
                                                 
23 Douglas North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Political Economy of 
Institutions and Decisions) (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 3–9. 
24 Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1997), 
144–146. 
25 Steven Kerr, “On the Folly of Rewarding A, While Hoping for B,” Academy of Management 
Review 18, no. 4 (1975), 771.  
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utility model. Agents will respond to their organization or bosses. The reaction by a boss 
to the action by an agent will dictate how the organization will respond to certain 
behavior. If the agent is punished for a certain decision or action, then the same type of 
behavior will be avoided in the future and that will shape the culture of the 
organization.26  
This principal-agent framework from microeconomics gives us new insights. It 
was developed to help private firms in the business community figure out how corporate 
leaders should manage subordinates, but this approach is only barely being tapped to help 
understand military organizations. One exception is Feaver’s book Armed Servants, in 
which he develops his “agency theory” to the study of civil-military relations.27 Feaver 
uses the principal-agent approach to study how civilian bureaucratic/political leaders 
(principals) control the military agent. For simplicity, his approach characterizes the 
principal as the civilian leadership, which includes the President of the United States, 
Congress, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the offices of the Service 
Secretaries. The agent is characterized as the entire military, which is represented by 
senior military officers such as the Chairman of the Joint Staff and the Service Chiefs.28 
In a democracy, civilians control the military but the military has coercive power. On one 
extreme, the state needs to be protected from military defeat by a foreign power. A strong 
                                                 
26 Laffont and Martimort, Incentives, 13. The theory of incentives seeks to explain why people act the 
way they do. The theory originated in micro-economics and is currently one of the leading theoretical 
discussions in the economic field today. The theory is a general combination of contract theory, agency 
theory, and mechanism design. The theory of incentives explores how information problems create issues 
for the principal when creating a contract with an agent. 
27 Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 13. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory 
and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957) as quoted in 
Feaver, Armed Servants, 2,9,13.Huntington provides the classical model of how the military interacts with 
civilian leadership. His “civil-military relations theory” focuses on non-material incentives and rewards for 
the reasons why the military is subordinate to civilians. He believes the non-material concept of 
professionalism is the cornerstone for why the military concedes to political leaders. Especially in the 
United States, military agents would consider directly countering civilian leaders as unprofessional 
behavior. Furthermore, Huntington’s theory has survived for over forty years because it is grounded in 
democratic theory, which emphasizes civilian control of the military. Feaver believes Huntington’s 
classical approach is not sufficient and proposes his agency theory as an alternative. Feaver’s rationalist 
approach considers both material and non-material incentives. The material factors include the cost of the 
principal monitoring the agent’s behavior and the likelihood of the principal punishing the agent for 
“shirking” or not doing exactly what the principal would like the agent to do.  
28 Feaver, Armed Servants, 13–14. 
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military to protect the state is required. However, on the other extreme, a strong military 
also increases the ease of a military coup against the civilian leadership. Feaver’s “agency 
theory” explains the paradox between protection from a coup and battlefield defeat.29  
Similarly, Blanken and Lepore use a principal-agent model to explain strategic 
assessment efforts within the military. Their article highlights the principal-agent 
framework where the principal consists of civilian and military leadership (i.e., 
Washington, DC) and the agents are members of the military engaged in operations. In 
the case of strategic assessments, military principals utilize certain metrics to measure 
progress and effectiveness of military agents. There is much pressure on military 
principals to provide information regarding progress in any military campaign. This is 
especially true during the Afghanistan campaign from 2001 to the present. Therefore, 
Blanken and Lepore examine how the selection of metrics impacts the incentive structure 
for the agent. They argue that the agent’s behavior will be dictated by the metrics. Certain 
agents will conduct behavior to seek a certain metric rather than engage in behavior that 
might contribute to accomplishing the overall strategic and operational mission. Overall, 
Blanken and Lepore’s use of the principal-agent framework as it pertains to military 
organizations and assessments is useful to explain how the framework explains senior 
leader risk tolerance for junior leader autonomy in this thesis.30 
This evolution of the research on the relationship between senior leaders and 
subordinates is important. It shows that the actors in both roles are often driven by 
dynamics within their organization as much as the desire to accomplish goals in the 
external environment. This is crucial for the present research question, as such a form of 
analysis will provide actionable recommendations for optimizing the internal workings of 
the SF organization to better pursue the UW mission.  
                                                 
29 Feaver, Armed Servants, 7. 
30 Leo Blanken and Jason Lepore, “Performance Measurement in Military Operations,” Defence and 
Peace Economics forthcoming (2013), 4–6.  
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G. ROADMAP 
In the next chapter, an informal model using principal-agent theory is developed 
to help illustrate how this microeconomic approach will be useful in determining military 
leader to subordinate leader relations. Then, Chapter III’s empirical analysis will connect 
the model to reality. The cases chosen are two discrete time-periods taken from the 
conflict in Afghanistan. These provide a longitudinal analysis in which the key factor 
considered is allowed to vary. In other words, one time period features SF units allowing 
their junior a “long leash” (higher degree of subordinate autonomy), while the second 
features a “short leash” (lower degree of subordinate autonomy). This analysis highlights 
the impact of such variation on unit performance. The conclusion in Chapter IV will 
provide some policy recommendations and avenues for future research.  
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II. RISK TOLERANCE AND SUCCESS IN UNCONVENTIONAL 
WARFARE 
A. THE ESSENTIAL ARGUMENT OF RISK  
This chapter will now create an informal principal-agent model and then generate 
some arguments concerning risk tolerance in SF. When making decisions, military 
leaders always assess risk and try to mitigate any risk to the mission or to the force. The 
central argument in this thesis is that when senior SF commanders have a higher risk 
tolerance allowing decentralization and delegating junior officer decision making 
authority, SF organizations will be more effective in a complex and uncertain UW 
environment. In essence, this argument is derived from two assumptions: the agent is of 
high quality and has privileged access to relevant local information. If both of these 
criteria are met, then a decentralized system of decision making is superior to one of rigid 
control in a UW operational environment. An agent’s relevant local information (also 
called “private information”) can be characterized as the knowledge and understanding of 
a village, people, terrain, environment, culture, etc., at that particular time in that 
particular situation. He has better insights, knowledge, and situational awareness than 
anyone else. In this case, the agent should have more autonomy to make decisions and 
resources should be allocated to him for this purpose. However, the agent can make 
mistakes; the agent can go too far or go in a policy direction not in line with the 
principal’s vision.  
The principal may therefore feel that he must impose some sort of control on the 
agent to ensure he stays in line with the principal’s intent. The control measures reduce 
autonomy of the subordinate and decrease the risk to the superior and to the mission. 
Principals may feel incentivized to impose strict control measures on their agents because 
of the principal-agent relationships above them doing the same. However, I argue that 
opportunities and initiative can be lost. Therefore, given the nature of its agents and 
mission, SF principals must resist this temptation to control agents tightly, especially in 
an unconventional environment where flexibility and adaptability determine success. 
However, this thesis does not advocate the endorsement of risky or reckless behavior for 
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its own sake; it is about the delegation of authority and minimizing oversight to junior 
levels, which requires senior officers to accept more risk as a consequence.  
By utilizing the insights of principal-agent theory, I will show the mechanisms by 
which the degree of centralization should be set/calibrated. The principal-agent model 
can highlight the incentive structure of any organization. One organization’s structure 
could work well for one environment but not the other. The organization’s “principal” 
(senior leader) imposes the acceptable level of risk tolerance. The “agent” (junior leader) 
responds accordingly and conducts actions representative of the type of behavior 
rewarded by the organization. 
First, this section introduces the two players involved in the principal-agent 
interaction. Next, the assumptions regarding how the principal-agent model is tailored to 
military organizations are listed. Then, preferences of the principal and agent, an essential 
paradigm of the principal-agent framework, are discussed, along with the implications of 
asymmetrical information or private information when it is held by one or both sides. 
These divergent preferences and asymmetrical information creates problems between the 
principal and the agent, and the principal has the option of imposing costly monitoring 
and punishment mechanisms to ensure compliance. An analysis of possible monitoring 
and punishment mechanisms conclude this section.31 
1. The Principal 
There is a “boss” (principal) who wants some goal accomplished. In the military, 
this command authority is explained in ADP 6–0 Mission Command so the term “mission 
command” will encompass both the formal rules and procedures of the organization and 
the individual’s leadership and their command style.32 Senior leaders can influence junior 
leader behavior through incentives (reward and punish system). Utilizing the principal-
agent framework, in a military context, the principal is any senior military officer and the 
                                                 
31 Feaver, Armed Servants, 54.  
32 U.S. Dept. of Defense, ADP 6–0 Mission Command, 1. Mission command is defined as the 
“exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative 
within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land 
operations.” 
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agent is any junior military officer. Using the doctrine of “mission command,” the 
principal-agent framework exists in any leader-subordinate relationship in the military. 
This relationship can exist at any level, from the team leader to the overall commander. 
Furthermore, the principal consists of the individual’s leadership and command style 
along with the rules and standard operating procedures (SOP) of the unit. The principal’s 
guidance and direction are derived from the actual commander and the organization’s 
rule structure.  
2. The Agent 
Also incorporating the doctrine of “mission command,” the agent is the 
subordinate leader of the principal. They are both in the same chain of command and the 
agent reports directly to the principal. Again, the agent can exist at any level from a team 
leader to the overall commander. Furthermore, the subordinate (agent) wants to “look 
good” and “do a good job” because he values personal gain and career progression.33  
The agent does this by responding to the principal’s reward system. The agent considers 
both intrinsic and extrinsic rewards. In military units, intrinsic rewards are considered 
more important than extrinsic rewards. Intrinsic rewards can include peer recognition, 
additional tasks, increased responsibility, increased autonomy, and trust. Extrinsic 
rewards can include good evaluations, promotions, medals and awards. Similarly, 
punishments can be classified as bad evaluations, passed over for promotion, bad 
reputation among peers, nonselection for key assignments, increased oversight, and 
decreased autonomy.  
3. Assumptions 
The principal, as the leader, has a goal or objective but he cannot always do it 
himself. He therefore delegates the task to his subordinate agents. His agents do some 
service for him, and in order to motivate them, he utilizes an incentive system. Also, this 
thesis assumes that: 
                                                 
33 Brent Clemmer, “Aligned Incentives: Could the Army’s Award System Inadvertently be Hindering 
Counterinsurgency Operations?” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009). 
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 All military leaders are rational actors and place a high utility value on 
“mission success” 
 All military leaders consider themselves either a principal or an agent; a 
leader can be both simultaneously depending on interaction up or down 
the chain of command34  
 Agents possess relevant local information that the principal cannot know35 
 An organization’s proper fit to its environment will increase mission 
success 
In accordance with mission command doctrine, the principal is required to 
provide his intent, purpose, desired end state, guidance, training, and mentorship to the 
agent, so he is in the best position to make the right decisions. The principal provides the 
“what and why” of the mission, not the “how.” Likewise, the agent is expected to be 
successful. The mission should be successfully accomplished with a minimal waste of 
resources (people, equipment, money, and time). As such, the principal needs to control 
the military agent but not so much as he interferes with him conducting his mission. The 
military agent wants autonomy to conduct his mission but he cannot violate the direction 
of the principal.36 An agent’s preferences and relevant local information advantage 
creates choices for the agent that may not be in line with the principal. These preferences 
influence an agent’s decision process when deciding whether to work or shirk.  
4. Working and Shirking 
The traditional principal-agent framework of “working” and “shirking” can 
explain the interaction between the agent and the principal. However, we must clarify the 
definition of shirking as not doing exactly what the principal would like. It does not mean 
the agent is lazy or insubordinate. In economics, shirking means to avoid work because a 
rational economic actor wants to do the least amount of work for the most pay, however, 
this paradigm does not translate to the military, due to non-tangible factors such as 
                                                 
34 Feaver, Armed Servants, 97. 
35 Rothstein, Afghanistan, 108. For example, in the early years of OEF, the reason for autonomy given 
to SF was no one higher (principals in Washington, DC) knew any better method. They had no choice but 
to give that SF Commander autonomy so this could be considered forced decentralization. 
36 Feaver, Armed Servants, 2. 
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professionalism. Shirking in the military is when the agent does not follow the principal’s 
direction exactly. The more the agent deviates from the exact intention of the principal, 
the more it is shirking.37  
5. Preferences and Information 
The reason for this “shirking” is the agent might believe he has a better method or 
course of action for a particular military problem. He might not believe that the 
principal’s choice of action is appropriate for a particular situation. In this case, the agent 
has an information advantage over the principal due to his geographical position. 
Essentially, the agent shirks when he disagrees over the means rather than the ends, 
which separates a military focused principal-agent approach with traditional economic 
principal-agent approaches.38 Therefore, I will highlight some additional assumptions 
regarding the agent’s preferences. 
The military agent has three categories of preferences when interacting with a 
principal. Those preferences, while not mutually exclusive, are mission accomplishment, 
professional reward, and autonomy.39 He has specific preferences for mission 
accomplishment because it may involve life or death. The agent has to conduct the task; 
he is closest to the action, so he has a vested interest. The agent might know a better or 
best method for the task due to his position so close to the actual action. Also, the agent 
might need to change quickly, innovate, adapt, or overcome obstacles. Therefore, if the 
military agent does not agree with a particular decision made by the principal, the 
military agent is guilty of shirking.40 Secondly, the agent has preferences as to how his 
behavior may be professionally rewarded by his superior and peers. The principal writes 
his evaluations, which are directly correlated to his future. Also, how peers view the 
agent is extremely important. The culture of the military places an important value on 
                                                 
37 Feaver, Armed Servants, 3. 
38 Feaver, Armed Servants, 59–60. 
39 Feaver, Armed Servants, 63. 
40 Feaver, Armed Servants, 62–64. A famous example of shirking can be found in General Douglas 
MacArthur’s interaction with President Harry Truman. President Truman evidentially fired MacArthur for 
his “shirking” behavior.  
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honor and professionalism among one’s peer group.41 In sum, the agent does not want a 
bad reputation within the organization because it could be detrimental. Finally, the agent 
has a preference for how the principal monitors his behavior. The agent does not want to 
be micro-managed by the principal; most theories utilizing the principal-agent approach 
indicate that the agent values autonomy to make decisions and implement those decisions 
the way the agent see fit.42 Based on these preferences, shirking becomes possible 
because the principal has different preferences. Shirking can occur because although the 
principal and agent both want what is best for the unit, they may disagree on the method 
or means to reach a desired outcome (mission success). 
A central reason an agent’s preferences can differ from the principal’s preferences 
is asymmetrical information between the two. The agent might have more local 
information than the principal because in an SF unconventional environment, the agent is 
on the ground and knows the situation intimately. Usually, the principal really only 
knows what the agent, or other agents, tell him. The agent in this case might feel he is 
best suited to make a decision concerning events unfolding on the ground so an 
information asymmetry exists because the principal really has no way to know if the 
military agent intends to shirk or not.43 Furthermore, an agent’s relevant private 
information can illuminate fleeting opportunities, which can be lost unless a quick 
decision is made. The agent is the only person with this information, which can be 
characterized as the knowledge and understanding of a village, people, terrain, 
environment, culture, etc., at that particular time in that particular situation. In such 
conditions, the agent should have wider autonomy to make decisions and resources 
should be allocated to him for this purpose. In this case, the private information the agent 
has can result in success only if the principal gives him autonomy; as the principal cannot 
verify that information and its “worth”—it would have to trust the agent to get the job 
done.  
                                                 
41 Feaver, Armed Servants, 63–64. Classic civil-military relations use this preference as the most 
important factor in explaining how civilians control the military. 
42 Feaver, Armed Servants, 64. 
43 Feaver, Armed Servants, 70. 
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The principal also has his own preferences. Since agents have a wide range of 
options they can choose from for any particular task or objective; the agent can either 
work or the agent can shirk. Whenever the principal provides autonomy to the agent, a 
wide range of outcomes can be expected. In a situation where the agent enjoys complete 
autonomy with no interference from the principal, two extremes, from negative to 
positive, can result from this autonomy. On the negative extreme, complete autonomy 
can result in bad decisions by the agent. The agent can misuse or misallocate precious 
resources. The agent can violate the intent of the principal (violate mission command 
doctrine). The agent might disrupt adjacent unit actions and interfere with other teams or 
U.S. entities trying to achieve some goal. The agent might empower the enemy through 
his mistakes, and this could result in mission failure. The agent could embarrass his unit, 
his service, his government, and his nation. Worst of all, the agent can get his soldiers 
killed. On the positive extreme, an autonomous agent can discover innovative and 
creative solutions to any task or situation. The agent can find a better use of resources. 
The agent can capitalize on superior information from his position so close to the action, 
which may prove crucial to mission success.  
The principal also has information that is unknown to the agent. Only the 
principal knows how much value he will put upon any specific activity and how much 
risk he will assume to achieve a specific outcome. The principal may judge risk 
differently and that judgment is impossible to know in advance. His judgment can change 
rapidly and often. The principal will provide the military agent with “orders” but as 
events evolve so may the principal’s preferences and judgment of risk. The agent may be 
working at first, but might be shirking when the principal adjusts his decisions or 
judgments, their preferences thereby change, and the result is information asymmetry.44 
Also, the principal might have a better view of the bigger picture. The principal can see 
other units either nearby or far way and how their actions can interfere with the agent. 
The principal also might have better information on interagency or other governmental 
efforts. Furthermore, war is rare and the military agent does not get to demonstrate its 
true “type” to the principal. Although training exercises promote readiness, there is no 
                                                 
44 Feaver, Armed Servants, 69. 
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replication of real combat where the military agent might lose; the enemy always has a 
say in the outcome. The principal will never really know how effective the agent is until 
actual battle where the stakes are much higher; lives can be lost and the state may be 
defeated.45 Finally, the principal would be the first to discover if his superior (his own 
principal) changes his intent or guidance. This would have a cascading effect on all 
principal agent relationships below them on the military hierarchy.  
6. Monitoring and Control Mechanisms 
These information asymmetries, coupled with different preferences between the 
principal and the agent, create conditions for problems between the principal and the 
agent. The agent’s private information is a problem because a principal rewarding 
autonomous activity could lead to “cowboy” behavior, but the principal will have to take 
that risk for mission accomplishment (if that local/private information coupled with agent 
initiative is crucial for mission success). Therefore, the principal has the option to impose 
control and monitoring mechanisms to mitigate the effects of these problems that can 
occur when the principal and agent have private information and preferences for 
outcomes. These controls can be either intrusive or non-intrusive depending on how 
much the principal believes the agent will work or shirk. In an unconventional 
environment, the principal can monitor the agent’s behavior through the mission approval 
process, reporting requirements, direct interference with the mission, and micro-
managing the agent. As part of the mission approval process, the agent is required to plan 
any activity. That plan must then be briefed to the principal for approval. This is one of 
the principal’s primary control measures. Since an agent is shirking when he is doing 
something outside of the intent of the principal, the military agent is shirking when he 
conducts some type of tactical action, uses different tactics or methods, that was not part 
of the principal’s approved plan. There can be many cases where the agent is working at 
first, but events unfold, and the agent ends up shirking. On a small scale, the agent, being 
rational, wants to get the most reward for the least amount of work. However, in this 
military context, the agent, being professional, might want to complete the task in a 
                                                 
45 Feaver, Armed Servants, 70. 
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manner or method that differs from the principal’s direction. In either case, the agent is 
shirking. The principal, on the other hand, wants to create a contract to get the maximum 
amount of work from the agent with the least amount of shirk. After the principal decides 
on how much he wants to either non-intrusively or intrusively monitor the agent, the 
agent decides how much to work or shirk based on his own value of how different his 
preferences are from the principal. Also, the agent will evaluate how much possible 
punishment from the principal will affect his value of shirking.46  
Furthermore, problems can occur when the agent chooses to shirk rather than 
work and the agent provides information to the principal that indicates superior 
performance. In this case the principal cannot monitor the actual behavior and must rely 
on outcome orientated factors to judge the performance of the agent. Therefore, the 
shirking agent will use whatever monitoring effort by the principal to put forth their best 
performance, even though the monitoring effort may not indicate actual performance.47 
Effective monitoring mechanisms should create performance incentives that “pull” the 
agent in the right direction (as he strives to look good to the boss, he is doing good 
work).48 A problem occurs when the agent only conducts actions that will result in a 
promotion and not necessarily increase the military’s likelihood of success in combat. In 
an unconventional environment, this occurs when the agent is only telling his principal 
what he wants to hear. The agent is not articulating true results from the ground. This can 
change the principal’s idea of what is really happening. The principal cannot monitor the 
                                                 
46 Feaver, Armed Servants, 96, 103, 118, 180. As a result, six possible outcomes emerge when an 
agent decides either to work or shirk under intrusive or non-intrusive conditions and expect punishment 
from the principal. First, the agent can work under a principal’s non-intrusive monitoring systems. Second, 
the agent can shirk under non-intrusive monitoring systems and expect punishment from the principal. 
Third, the agent can shirk under non-intrusive monitoring systems and not expect punishment from the 
principal. Fourth, the agent can work under intrusive monitoring systems. Fifth, the agent can shirk under 
intrusive monitoring systems and expect punishment from the principal, and sixth, the agent can shirk 
under intrusive monitoring systems and not expect punishment from the principal. For example, during the 
Cold War, the military (agent) worked under the principal (civilian government) intrusive monitoring 
systems because the costs of monitoring were low and the agent expected punishment if it was caught 
shirking. Conversely, after the Cold War, during the Clinton Presidency, the military (agent) shirked under 
the principal’s (civilian government) intrusive monitoring systems because the external environment 
changed and the agent perceived weakness within the principal, which created low expectations of 
punishment for shirking.  
47 Feaver, Armed Servants, 55. 
48 Blanken and Lepore, “Performance Measurement in Military Operations,” 4–6. 
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agent’s actual behavior and he can only tell if his is effective from his reports and any 
operational outcomes.49  
B. SPECIAL FORCES AND GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES: ATTRIBUTES 
AND ENVIRONMENTS 
To develop the argument that risk tolerance for decentralization should match 
mission environment, this section discusses the two different types of organizations that 
exist in the U.S. Army. One type of organization is the conventional General Purpose 
Forces (GPF). The other type is the Army’s Special Forces (SF). A quick discussion of 
how organizations either focus on internal “machine bureaucracy” processes or external 
“adhocracy” processes will illuminate the differences in the two organizations. I will 
argue that inward-orientation characterizes GPF, while external-orientation characterizes 
SF. While on opposite ends of a spectrum, both focuses and processes are appropriate to 
each organization’s mission and environment.50 Then I discuss the different attributes of 
each and what each type of organization is built to do. This will help highlight the 
environments and missions that can either fit or not fit with various risk tolerance 
arrangements. 
Military organizations have two choices when presented with a task and they do 
not have much information, which creates uncertainty. The organizations can either 
increase their “information-processing capacity” or they can restructure their 
organizations to be able to accomplish the task with less information than is needed.51 An 
organization that decides to increase its information-processing capacity will create a 
                                                 
49 Laffont and Martimort, Incentives, 147, 256. A good example of this type of problem is the auto 
insurance industry. Insurance companies provide policies to drivers who may say they are good drivers. 
The insurance company has no real way to know if they are good drivers or not but can make an 
assumption based on past performance. The driver has private knowledge of how good a driver he is and 
the insurance company would expect the driver to drive well and not be reckless. However, the company 
cannot observe the driver’s action. The company can change the contract after an accident or something 
similar, but until then, the driver can drive reckless for a long period of time before the company knows 
what the risk really was. Therefore, the reckless driver has an incentive to portray himself as a good driver 
so he can get insurance. The good driver has less of incentive to portray himself any differently because he 
knows he is a good driver. Similarly, the reckless driver will continue to drive reckless because he knows 
insurance will cover any damages. 
50 Edward N. Luttwak, “Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare,” Parameters (Dec 1983), 333–342. 
51 Van Creveld as quoted in Rothstein, Afghanistan, 102. 
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complex centralized highly-informational command and control structure that attempts to 
minimize uncertainty. The other organization will deal with the fact that uncertainty 
exists and adapt based on individual situations. This organization will be flexible, 
adaptable, and decentralized.52 States tend to organize their conventional militaries in the 
former organizational model because they have a large amount of resources at their 
disposal. Vast resources do not necessitate accomplishing tasks with minimal personnel, 
technology, or equipment. Large resource intensive organizations are structured to 
maximize their internal processes because the mission, hierarchy, division of tasks and 
labor, and staff functions all require intensive “mechanistic” processes to be efficient. In 
these organizations, the changing external environment is a secondary focus because the 
internal processes are developed first. Organizations that organize to accomplish tasks 
with minimal information, on the other hand, are usually forced into this configuration 
because of no other choice. They analyze their external environment and develop 
missions, tasks, and functions based on this. This results in a flexible organization that 
can change and adapt as quickly as the environment.53 
1. General Purpose Forces: Unit Attributes 
The conventional U.S. Army GPF is an internal-process-driven “machine 
bureaucracy.” The size of the Army requires control measures so commanders can direct 
young soldiers easily through clear simple rules and discipline. It is this way because it is 
structured to fight the “American way of war,” which is massing firepower against a 
symmetrical enemy.54 The U.S. Army GPF is extremely proficient when facing a visible 
enemy on a linear battlefield. New technology, precision weapons, and top-of-the-line 
equipment make the U.S. military a formidable foe. Furthermore, the Army’s training and 
leader development doctrine outlines the Army’s force generation policy and guidance. In 
it, the Army builds combat units through a “progression of training and mission 
preparation.” This ensures units are ready to deploy to combat and accomplish the 
                                                 
52 Rothstein, Afghanistan, 104. 
53 Rothstein, Afghanistan, 142. 
54 Rothstein, Afghanistan, 3, 142.  
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Army’s mission. To ensure uniformity among units, mission essential task lists are 
developed and used by leaders as a measure of performance. “The Chief of Staff, Army 
(CSA) directed the Army-wide implementation of standardized full spectrum operations 
mission essential task list (FSO METLs) down to brigade level. The FSO METL is based 
on the tasks the unit was organized and designed to perform.”55 Machine bureaucracies 
also use standardized processes to ensure uniformity among subordinate units in order to 
maximize efficiency. 
2. Special Forces: Unit Attributes  
However, unconventional environments differ significantly from a conventional 
battlefield. Success may depend on using unconventional methods and forces. The U.S. 
Army SF is supposed to be the force that can conduct unconventional warfare (UW), 
which focuses on working with and through indigenous forces.56 In situations where  
UW is the best course of action to counter a threat, kinetic force may not be the best 
option and a holistic approach may be necessary. Instead of focusing on merely engaging 
enemy combatants, the enemy’s culture, strategy, background, economic and political 
considerations, and psychology should be taken into account.57 To accomplish this 
“indirect” approach, the organization must recognize and reward unorthodox actions 
instead of easily measurable kinetic effects like “body count.”58 Furthermore, the best 
organizational configuration would be an externally focused decentralized “adhocracy-
type” entity capable of adapting to rapidly changing external events and threats.  
                                                 
55 U.S. Dept. of Defense, Army Regulation (AR) 350–1 Army Training and Leader Development 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2011), 1. 
56 U.S. Dept. of Defense, JP 3–05 Special Operations, II-9. ADP 3–05 Special Operations, 9. 
Unconventional warfare is considered “activities to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, 
disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, 
auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.” Doctrine also states that these types of missions carry 
significant risk and are usually politically sensitive. An enormous amount of planning goes into any UW 
operation and would require specific authority to do so. Doctrine also classifies UW as being 
“characterized by innovative design” because the method of execution must be creative. SFODAs have to 
convince an insurgent movement to work with them and this would require quick reaction and decision 
making on the ground.  
57 Rothstein, Afghanistan, 155. 
58 Rothstein, Afghanistan, 137–138. 
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Of course, leadership has an enormous role in how effective the organization can 
be. A typical army leader receives education and training throughout his entire career. 
The vast majority of army leaders acquire base-line knowledge, skills, and abilities 
(KSA) that are fairly standardized. When making decisions, military leaders always 
assess risk and try to mitigate any risk to the mission or to the force. However, as each 
leader progresses through his career, the organizations that each officer will be a part of 
can be vastly different. Two different organizations, one SF and the other GPF, have 
different missions and are meant to operate in two different threat environments. 
Therefore, the leader attributes that are valued by each organization should also be 
different. Also, before being allowed to work in a SF organization, SF leaders receive 
extra training, which highlights the specific attributes valued by SF. Candidates for SF 
must first undergo an extensive evaluation, and if they qualify, they then attend training 
and qualification, which may take an average soldier up to two years to complete. 
Historically, the majority fails to meet the selection and assessment criteria because SF 
have strict quality control mechanisms as they seek the best candidates. Evaluation 
criteria stress innovative thinking, problem-solving, and “human domain” related 
judgment activities. SF students are evaluated and trained in a specific job, such as 
weapons, communications, demolitions, or medical so they become an expert in their 
respective field, which is a force multiplying asset. Students must also complete an 
intensive language, area orientation, and cultural training course, as well as a survival and 
capture resistance course before ever reporting to their operational Special Forces units. 
The purpose of this extra training is to prepare soldiers to successfully operate in an 
ambiguous UW environment.59  
3. The Conventional Warfighting Environment 
Conventional war is often characterized by a linear battlefield in which massive 
firepower can be focused and applied upon a visible enemy. The enemy’s command 
                                                 
59 Special Forces soldiers are trained by the 1st Special Warfare Training Group (1st SWTG) within 
the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS) at Fort Bragg, North 
Carolina. Instructors are all prior Special Forces team members and most have extensive experience in the 
Groups. These instructors rotate from operational Special Forces Groups to the school in order to teach real 
world applicable skills and keep the school’s curriculum current.  
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structure, logistical support, and maneuver elements can be systematically destroyed, 
which will result in a victory. In this organization and environment, orders are detailed 
and command is centralized; information flows down. Many maneuver elements need to 
be coordinated so control is necessarily restrictive. Uniformity between units and soldiers 
is critical for successful control. Standard operating procedures help ensure conformity 
within this system to ensure efficiency of output.60 Conventional forces are built to 
operate in this type of environment. It has a hierarchical and centralized control structure 
and many aspects of a “machine bureaucracy” with internally-focused processes because 
it was essentially designed to engage in large scale attrition warfare, such as were 
conducted in World War II.61 When conducting such heavy force-on-force engagements, 
there is a limited range of the “possible” and it is easy to create a machine of purpose-
built subordinate tasks/roles that do not vary widely. This may be the best way to 
maintain control and efficiency in a large organization, but it does not respond well to 
change or uncertainty in the environment. 
4. The Unconventional Warfighting Environment 
The unconventional warfare mission set requires a dedicated effort in a prolonged 
indirect engagement with the population of the subject state. This requires an 
organizational culture that values and rewards indirect action.62 Information flows up in 
this decentralized flexible organization. Military leaders receive information from the 
bottom where soldiers are conducting UW missions in remote locations. The agent 
accomplishes their tasks based on general guidance and intent of their superiors. Such an 
agent requires vast amounts of training and education in order to be trusted with this 
mission. Senior officers assume risk because of the amount of autonomy provided to 
junior leaders. This structure is necessary in the unconventional warfighting environment 
                                                 
60 Mintzberg, Organizational Design, 7. 
61 Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare (Monterey, 
CA: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2006), 99. 
62 Rothstein, Afghanistan, 178. 
 31
because the threat is ambiguous and complex.63 Furthermore, the number of threats to the 
U.S. by non-state actors, either terrorist or insurgent, and the technology that supports 
their movements is at a higher level than ever before. U.S. interests and its role as a large 
conventional power is a mismatch to the environment in which these complex threats 
exist. Non-state actors typically use indirect approaches, effective because of their 
decentralized nature, which makes it difficult for western governments to counter.64 
C. THE ASSESSMENT  
A military principal has a choice along a spectrum between “directive command” 
and “restrictive control” as he directs and guides his agent.65 Under directive command, 
the principal allows agent autonomy because decision making is decentralized. 
Subordinate commanders receive intent and an end-state. They are provided resources 
and are expected to complete their mission using initiative, flexibility, and intuition. A 
key aspect is the importance of training, mentorship, and education needed so they will 
succeed. On the other end of the spectrum, decision making is centralized under a 
restrictive control paradigm. Orders are detailed and emerge from a central command. 
Subordinate commanders are expected to follow orders exactly. This rigid system ensures 
conformity among all subordinate commands and commanders. This helps mitigate 
potential problems in a highly complex operation that requires detailed planning and 
synchronization. Reality does not exist at either extreme of this spectrum but will fit 
                                                 
63 U.S. Dept. of Defense, Joint Publication (JP) 1–02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military 
and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013), 146. Joint Publication 
1–02 defines irregular warfare as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and 
influence over the relevant populations. The joint pub goes on to say that irregular warfare can use either 
indirect or asymmetric approaches to conflict as well as direct means to destroy an opponent’s will to fight. 
Irregular warfare becomes “complex” when its defeat requires a wide variety of agencies. Complex 
Irregular Warfare cannot be countered by military means alone; it must be countered with the full range of 
options available to the United States. The fact that it is complex means there is no simple solution to the 
problem. The method in which the U.S. counters this threat must also be complex.  
64 Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” Joint Forces Quarterly 52 (2009), 34–39. 
65 Martin Van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 269 as 
quoted in Rothstein, Afghanistan, 103–105. Van Creveld describes two types of command and control. The 
first type is one extreme where the central authority knows everything and presents perfect orders. The 
second type is the other extreme where the unit, in a forward location, knows everything, and they have the 
autonomy to do what is required. The correct balance on this spectrum depends on the individual situation. 
Furthermore, resources need to go to the lowest level where the knowledge and situational awareness 
reside. Although the senior officer is assuming risk, a way to mitigate risk is to ensure the junior officer is 
prepared for the task. 
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somewhere in-between the two extremes.66 However, the idea of directive command 
closely resembles “mission command” as described in ADP 6–0 and as required in 
General Odierno’s vision. Highly adaptive leaders to counter ambiguous threats are 
necessary for the U.S. to win. Furthermore, decentralized decision making, in custom 
situations (as every situation is different), works best when senior commanders cannot 
understand what is really going on. These senior commanders should accept risk in 
allowing decentralization. In other words, leaders should provide their subordinates with 
a “long leash” to allow for the autonomy and flexibility required to succeed in a UW 
environment. 
Special Forces are designed to be autonomous entities that conduct 
unconventional warfare. Flexibility, trust, initiative, teamwork, and discipline are all 
attributes that will win on this type of battlefield. However, principal-agent literature 
indicates that superiors (principals) will control or monitor subordinates (agents) in order 
to reduce the informational problems that exist between a superior and subordinate. 
When agents have relevant local private information and different preferences, control 
measures are necessary from a principal’s point of view to mitigate those problems. The 
level of control is the factor that each principal can adjust based on the individual 
mission, environment, and context. Special Forces units conducting unconventional 
warfare are usually conducting such a mission far from the unit’s commander, perhaps in 
a foreign country with a semi-permissive environment. The level of control imposed on 
the SF unit by the commander will dictate how much autonomy the SF unit actually has.  
As previously mentioned, SF conducting unconventional warfare require 
autonomy. The agent must build trust with the principal in order to receive the reward of 
autonomy. The principal must ease control of the agent to provide autonomy. The danger, 
of course, exists when the agent fails and the principal is blamed. The principal becomes 
the agent of his own superior officer. The superior blames the junior for the failure and 
                                                 
66 Martin Samuels, Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German 
Armies, 1888–1918 (London: Frank Cass & Co, 1995), 5–6. The period between World War I and World 
War II is useful to highlight the differences between directive command and restrictive control. The 
German Army closely resembled a directive command system and the British Army resembled a restrictive 
control system.  
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this effect ripples through the entire chain of command. This fact reduces the principal’s 
incentive to ease control mechanisms and allow autonomy for the agent. The principal is 
incentivized to increase control and decrease autonomy. This problem is compounded 
due to the multiple layers of principal-agent relationships and problems that exist in any 
military chain of command. One principal-agent problem between one superior and one 
subordinate can turn into nine principal-agent problems up the chain of command: from 
the lowest unit leader to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or U.S. government 
civilian authorities. This results in a misfit between what organizational theory calls for in 
a complex uncertain environment. The organization and mission command become 
obtuse and inflexible.  
I argue that current designs for C2 of conventional military operations are 
incompatible with C2 requirements for UW. When making decisions, U.S. military 
leaders always assess risk and try to mitigate any “risk to the mission” or “risk to the 
force.” How much risk a leader is willing to assume is based on his analysis of the 
situation (both enemy and friendly) and his mission, among many other factors. During 
conventional military operations, a leader does not need to place himself or the mission at 
risk through decentralized authority because he keeps his subordinates on a “short leash” 
through various control mechanisms. However, I argue that in order to be successful in a 
UW environment a leader must be willing to assume more risk by allowing subordinate 
autonomy and decentralization because, as I will show, these are critical for success in a 
UW environment. 
D. CASE SELECTION 
I chose Afghanistan as my case study because it is a particularly relevant case of 
UW where the PA model is especially well delineated. Afghanistan is not meant to be 
representative of all SF missions around the world. Rather the empirical cases were 
selected for two reasons. First, Afghanistan is an intrinsically important case; almost 
every leader in SF today has been in Afghanistan at some time during the past fourteen 
years, and subsequently this conflict will have an inordinate impact on the structure and 
culture of the organization. Their experience in Afghanistan, and the way control was 
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imposed by leaders on SF units, will have implications on the way they view proper 
control in the future. Second, the cases chosen provide a reasonable longitudinal pre-
test/post-test design, in which a multitude of potentially confounding factors are 
controlled for, while the key factor under consideration (leash length) is allowed to vary. 
Therefore, I apply the PA model to SF units in Afghanistan in 2001 and 2006. A 
longitudinal case study of the conflict in Afghanistan shows that in 2001 SF had a “long 
leash” to allow for autonomy and flexibility, which was necessary to succeed in an 
unconventional warfare (UW) environment. However, by 2006, the leash was shortened 
and more control measures were implemented. While a “short leash” may be appropriate 
for a conventional battlefield, it negatively impacts SF effectiveness in a UW 
environment. 
Although the period in Afghanistan from 2002–2005 was extremely rich with 
various degrees of risk acceptance and risk tolerance by principals at all levels, the next 
time period considered within this thesis is 2006 because the author has personal 
experience in Afghanistan during this time period.  
SF missions in Afghanistan in 2001 were conducted in an environment that was 
complex and unstable, which means there were many variables that affected the SF unit 
and those variables changed quickly. The SF unit was conducting its UW mission 
working with and through an indigenous force. There was a high level of risk tolerance 
by senior leaders (principals), which provided ample autonomy to the junior leaders on 
the ground (although they had no other choice). SF missions in Afghanistan in 2001 are 
an example of a “long leash” operation. 
SF missions in Afghanistan in 2006 were also conducted in an environment that 
was complex and unstable, with many variables affecting the SF unit and those variables 
changed very quickly. The SF unit was conducting a blend of its UW and FID mission. 
There was a low level of risk tolerance by senior leaders (principals) and all missions had 
to be approved at extremely high levels. Resources were centralized and controlled by a 
senior authority and junior leaders on the ground were not provided very much 
autonomy. SF missions in Afghanistan in 2006 are an example of a “short leash” 
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operation. It is important to note that although the control measures imposed by 
principals in 2006 were required based on the environment, I focus on the problems 
imposed on the agent’s autonomy due to the principal’s lack of incentive to allow 
decentralization. Afghanistan in 2006 highlights this aspect and it is used as a case study 
because most SF leaders today have been exposed to that environment and must be 
warned not to replicate it in a future UW campaign. 
In the following chapter, each of these case studies will be explored using the 
principal-agent model developed for SF leaders, units, missions, and environments. First 
I will discuss the background and environment, followed by the unit and mission, and 
then explain the actors. I will describe the principal and agent and discuss their 
preferences and information asymmetries. Next I will discuss the principal’s monitoring 
and control mechanisms and finally the analysis will focus on the principal’s use of 
mission command to influence the behavior of the agent. 
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III. THE CASE OF CHANGING RISK TOLERANCE IN 
AFGHANISTAN  
This case study will analyze two time periods in the same environment (2001 and 
2006) using the informal principal agent model formed in Chapter II. The first case study 
describes SF units operating in Afghanistan in 2001 and the second case study involves 
SF units operating in Afghanistan in 2006. 
A longitudinal case study of the conflict in Afghanistan shows that in 2001 SF 
had a “long leash” to allow for autonomy and flexibility, which was necessary to succeed 
in an unconventional warfare (UW) environment. However, by 2006, the leash was 
shortened and more control measures were implemented.  
Although the period in Afghanistan from 2002–2005 was extremely rich with 
various degrees of risk acceptance and risk tolerance by principals at all levels, the next 
time period considered within this thesis is 2006 because the author has personal 
experience in Afghanistan during this time period.  
Afghanistan is not meant to be representative of all SF missions around the world. 
Rather the empirical cases were selected for two reasons. First, Afghanistan is an 
intrinsically important case; almost every leader in SF today has been in Afghanistan at 
some time during the past fourteen years, and subsequently this conflict will have an 
inordinate impact on the structure and culture of the organization. Their experience in 
Afghanistan, and the way control was imposed by leaders on SF units, will have 
implications on the way they view proper control in the future. Second, the cases chosen 
provide a reasonable approximation of a longitudinal pre-test/post-test design, in which a 
multitude of potentially confounding factors are controlled for, while the key factor under 
consideration (leash length) is allowed to vary.67  
                                                 
67 On this design technique, see Gary King, Robert E. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social 
Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 221-
223, and Leo J. Blanken, Rational Empires: Institutional Incentives and Imperial Expansion (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2012), Ch.5. 
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A. SF MISSIONS IN AFGHANISTAN IN 2001 
SF missions in Afghanistan in 2001 were conducted in an environment that was 
complex and unstable, which means there were many variables that affected the SF unit 
and those variables changed quickly. The SF unit was conducting its UW mission 
working with and through an indigenous force. There was a high level of risk tolerance 
by senior leaders (principals), which provided ample autonomy to the junior leaders on 
the ground (although they had no other choice). SF missions in Afghanistan in 2001 are 
an example of a “long-leash” operation. 
1. Background and Environment 
On October 19, 2001, two U.S. Army Special Forces Operational Detachment-
Alpha (SFODAs 555 and 595) from 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) (SFG(A)), 
infiltrated by helicopter into remote locations in Afghanistan and proceeded to link up 
with Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance leaders to destroy the Taliban regime that was 
harboring al-Qaeda terrorists who were responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks on 
the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC.68 
These SFODAs reported to their next higher U.S. command structure in 
neighboring Uzbekistan at the Karshi-Khanabad Airbase (K2) where COL John 
Mulholland,69 the commander of 5th SFG(A), arrived and assumed command of “Task 
Force (TF) Dagger,” which was comprised by the 5th SFG(A) SFODAs and supporting 
units. From October until December 2001 when the Taliban regime collapsed, COL 
Mulholland reported directly to General Tommy Franks, Commander U.S. Central 
Command, via a daily video-telephone conference (VTC).70 Throughout November 
2001, additional SFODAs were inserted into Afghanistan and linked up with other 
Northern Alliance warlords as they maneuvered against Taliban forces.  
                                                 
68 Rothstein, Afghanistan, xiii. 
69 Now Lieutenant General Mulholland. 
70 Rothstein, Afghanistan, 108. 
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2. The Units and Mission  
Prior to deploying, the SFODAs developed their plans and studied Afghanistan’s 
tribes, terrain, and language. The SFODAs on the ground in Afghanistan were linked up 
with Northern Alliance leaders and their “armies,” one SFODA for each Northern 
Alliance “warlord,” to defeat the Taliban. The SFODAs were to conduct “special 
operations” with and through the Northern Alliance army. The method was 
unconventional warfare (UW).71 During this time period in Afghanistan, SFODAs were 
conducting decentralized operations and were provided a high degree of autonomy. The 
SFODAs, using broad operational guidance and intent from their superiors, conducted 
small unit actions in a complex and dynamic environment.72 The SFODAs were required 
to build trust with the indigenous force. However, the actual conduct of combat 
operations against the Taliban took a very conventional approach because the SFODAs 
were conducting “direct action.”73 The SFODAs guided precision munitions from  
U.S. air platforms onto Taliban ground targets that presented themselves in a linear 
formation in an open battlefield. The SFODAs destroyed the Taliban formations just like 
a conventional GPF unit would do. However, the infiltration and link up with the 
indigenous force made this engagement unconventional.  
                                                 
71 U.S. Dept. of Defense, JP 3–05 Special Operations, II-9. ADP 3–05 Special Operations, 9. 
Unconventional warfare is considered “activities to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, 
disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, 
auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.” Doctrine also states that these types of missions carry 
significant risk and are usually politically sensitive. An enormous amount of planning goes into any UW 
operation and would require specific authority to do so. Doctrine also classifies UW as being 
“characterized by innovative design” because the method of execution must be creative. SFODAs have to 
convince an insurgent movement to work with them and this would require quick reaction and decision 
making on the ground.  
72 Rothstein, Afghanistan, 99.  
73 U.S. Dept. of Defense, JP 3–05 Special Operations, II-5. ADRP 3–05 Special Operations, 2–5. 
Direct action is defined as “short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a 
special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and which employ specialized 
military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets.” Doctrine 
mentions that DA is different from a conventional offensive operation by the degree of risk involved, 
techniques utilized, and use of force applied. 
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3. The Principal and the Agent 
During this timeframe, minimal layers of principal-agent relationships existed. 
One relationship consisted of General Franks as the principal and COL Mulholland as the 
agent. Another principal-agent relationship consisted of COL Mulholland as the principal 
and his various subordinates, including the SFODA commanders, as the agents. 
However, since COL Mulholland, as commander of 5th SFG, represented the entire 
Army SF presence in Afghanistan, I consider COL Mulholland and the SFODAs as the 
only agent in this analysis. Therefore, only the relationship between GEN Franks and 
“SF” is analyzed. Also, the fact that minimal layers of principal-agent relationships 
existed minimized the amount of principal-agent problems. COL Mulholland conducted a 
daily VTC with GEN Franks. COL Mulholland asked for resources and GEN Franks 
directed those resources to him. Usually, multiple units compete with each other for 
resources and the principal (in this case GEN Franks) must analyze and allocate resources 
according to his preferences. With 5th SFG as the only unit, resource allocation was easy 
for the principal.74 
In accordance with mission command doctrine, GEN Franks, as principal, 
provided his intent, purpose, and desired end state (the “what and why” of the mission) to 
his agent. GEN Franks did not provide the “how.” The agent is expected to be successful 
and the mission should be successfully accomplished with a minimal waste of resources 
(people, equipment, money, and time). Time was of the essence because senior U.S. 
government officials, including SECDEF (GEN Frank’s principal) wanted results against 
the Taliban quickly. Also, more importantly, the principal did not really have any other 
choice but to provide autonomy to his agent due to the agent’s possession of relevant 
local information. 
4. Preferences and Information 
In October 2001, the principal’s and agent’s preferences were almost identical. 
They both wanted, generally, immediate results and minimal friendly casualties. This 
similarity of preferences reduced the chances of “shirking” by the agent. The principal’s 
                                                 
74 Rothstein, Afghanistan, 136.  
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preferences included that the agent will work (align itself with the principal) and the 
agent will be effective. The agent’s preferences were mission accomplishment and 
professional reward. While, of course, the principal’s preferences also included mission 
accomplishment, the important part of this preference was that both principal and agent 
preferred the same method to gain mission accomplishment: SFODAs would partner with 
their indigenous force and eliminate all enemy targets using the weapons and technology 
available.  
However, there was a large information asymmetry, which has potential to create 
principal-agent problems. The SFODAs possessed relevant local information because in 
this unconventional environment, the agent was the only U.S. DOD entity on the ground 
with the warlords. GEN Franks was heavily dependent on the SFODAs to provide 
information and judgments on the next course of action. This bottom-up information flow 
put CENTCOM in a receiving mode rather than a directing mode. The SFODAs were 
distributed throughout Afghanistan and demonstrated the effectiveness of small, low cost 
distributed operations.75 
The SFODAs had the knowledge and understanding of the situation on the 
ground. In this case, the agent had complete autonomy to make decisions and resources 
were allocated to him for this purpose because the principal knew that the “special” 
information the agent had can result in success only if the principal gives him autonomy. 
The principal could not verify that information and its “worth,” so he trusted the agent to 
get the job done.  
5. Monitoring and Control Mechanisms 
The principal did not feel a need to impose intrusive monitoring and control 
mechanisms on the agent (he was not incentivized to do so). Also, there were not many 
monitoring and control mechanisms to choose from. The limited monitoring options were 
not ideal for the principal but due to similar preferences between the principal and agent, 
the information asymmetry was not a big enough factor to incentivize intrusive control 
mechanisms. The principal used a VTC for daily interaction with the agent where both 
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could discuss events, resources, intent, guidance, and direction. The agent provided his 
relevant local information to the principal, which gave the principal measures of progress 
toward his goal.76  
Also, the principal could utilize different forms of technology to receive updates 
on the agent’s progress. For instance, he could view satellite imagery to see Taliban troop 
movements (if they were retreating, it was a sign of positive progress). Also, the air 
platforms in theater could provide battle damage assessments after they dropped their 
ordnance. However, these sources of information were not as reliable or rich as the 
SFODAs actions and observations. The SFODAs were small and agile; they moved with 
the Afghan factions on horseback or ATVs. They had small portable computers with 
them that allowed them to send reports and talk to their principal. This technology 
allowed them to be flexible and adaptable because they were not tied to any particular 
location.77 
6. Analysis 
The mission command structure between the principal and agent was direct with 
minimal interference; minimal layers of interaction resulted in few processes and 
minimal bureaucratic interference. As the agent enjoyed autonomy, with minimal 
interference from the principal, the principal is worried that, on the negative extreme, this 
autonomy can result in bad decisions by the agent where the agent puts effort toward the 
wrong goal, loses precious resources, or even violates the principal’s intent. However, in 
Afghanistan in 2001, SF and GEN Franks had similar preferences and the autonomy 
provided to the SFODAs resulted in the teams discovering innovative and creative 
solutions to the situation they were in. GEN Franks provided a “long leash” to SF 
(although he really did not have any other choice). They found the best use of their 
minimal resources and capitalized on their superior information from their position so 
close to the action, which proved crucial to mission success.78 
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The situation and mission in Afghanistan in 2001 was dynamic and complex. The 
principal accepted a large amount of risk by allowing autonomy for his agent but the 
uncertain environment required flexibility, adaptability, and autonomy. The principal’s 
choice of command and control resembled “directive command” where the agent receives 
intent and end-state, is provided resources, and are expected to complete their mission 
using initiative, flexibility, and intuition. This closely resembles “mission command” as 
described in ADP 6–0 and as required in General Odierno’s vision because highly 
adaptive leaders to counter indirect threats are necessary for the U.S. to win. 
The principal knew that rewarding autonomous activity could lead to “cowboy” 
behavior, but that risk was necessary for mission accomplishment because that local 
information coupled with agent initiative was crucial for mission success. Overall, the 
agent chooses whether to work or shirk based on his own preferences and how much he 
believes the principal will punish him for shirking. In Afghanistan 2001, the agent 
worked under the principal’s non-intrusive monitoring systems.79 The principal had no 
other options for monitoring but since the agent’s preferences were similar, the agent 
worked. This was both effective and efficient in this unconventional environment.  
Although the period in Afghanistan from 2002–2005 was extremely rich with 
various degrees of risk acceptance and risk tolerance by principals at all levels, the next 
time period considered within this thesis is 2006 because the author has personal 
experience in Afghanistan during this time period.  
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 44
B. SF MISSIONS IN AFGHANISTAN IN 2006 
SF missions in Afghanistan in 2006 were also conducted in an environment that 
was complex and unstable, with many variables affecting the SF unit and those variables 
changed very quickly. The SF unit was conducting a blend of its UW and FID mission. 
There was a low level of risk tolerance by senior leaders (principals) and all missions had 
to be approved at extremely high levels. Resources were centralized and controlled by a 
senior authority and junior leaders on the ground were not provided very much 
autonomy. SF missions in Afghanistan in 2006 are an example of a “short-leash” 
operation. It is important to note that although the control measures imposed by 
principals in 2006 were required based on the environment, I focus on the problems 
imposed on the agent’s autonomy due to the principal’s lack of incentive to allow 
decentralization. Afghanistan in 2006 highlights this aspect and it is used as a case study 
because most SF leaders today have been exposed to that environment and must be 
warned not to replicate it in a future UW campaign. 
1. Background and Environment 
By early 2002, the Taliban was disposed and U.S. sponsored Northern Alliance 
forces assumed control of the country. Also in 2002, the conventional U.S. Army GPF 
assumed command in Afghanistan.80 SF increased its presence in Afghanistan and 
formed a Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF). Each SFODA 
established a base of operations throughout the country and organized, paid, trained, and 
advised their own Afghan force, called the Afghan Security Force (ASF) that could fight 
the enemy. In 2006, the Afghan Security Force (ASF) was demobilized because it was 
considered a militia and not under the control of the central Afghan government like the 
Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), and Afghan Border 
Police (ABP). Also, by 2006, JSOAs were removed and the country was divided up into 
AOs with GPF battalion commanders as “battle-space owners.” 
SFODA commanders were under a SF chain of command, which included first 
the AOB commander, then SOTF commander, and finally CJSOTF commander. The 
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CJSOTF commander reported to the U.S. Forces Commander. However, GPF battalion 
commanders “owned” the battle space and SFODAs operated within their “AO.” 
Although no formal command relationship existed, the SFODA and GPF Battalion would 
informally coordinate, share intelligence, and support each other’s operations when they 
could; it was a mutually supporting relationship. The AOB usually coordinated at the 
Battalion’s parent Brigade and SOTF coordinated at the Brigade’s parent Division, which 
made up the HQ of the Regional Command (RC), which reported to the U.S. Forces 
Commander.  
2. The Units and Mission 
In 2006, SF was rotating SFODAs every eight months, although some SF soldiers 
stated they would prefer to stay longer because after 3–4 tours, they noticed that progress 
made in the first tour would be lost by the fourth and they would have to start over 
again.81 The mission had transitioned to largely a FID focus with the Afghan forces.82 
SFODAs partnered with various Afghan forces (whoever was near their “firebase”) and 
conducted missions against targets developed from intelligence gained from the 
population in the local area.  
However, the overall U.S. strategy focused on “attrition” rather than maneuver 
due to presence of GPF commanding all U.S. Forces in the theater.83 SF was incorporated 
under this complex command and control arrangement and was provided little autonomy. 
The increase in process and bureaucracy slowed the decision cycle for everything.84 
3. The Principal and the Agent 
In this time period, there were multiple layers of principals and agents, even 
though the GPF HQ sought to maintain one chain of command so it could “better 
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control” U.S. forces in Afghanistan. By 2006, more units started to arrive in Afghanistan 
and every U.S. military organization had the same purpose, which was to defeat the 
enemy. Therefore, each U.S. military organization sought to defeat the enemy by 
capitalizing on their unit’s training, structure, and people. As more units arrived, they all 
had to compete with each other for resources and the principal had to analyze and 
allocate resources according to his preferences.85 
This case study will focus on two layers of principal-agent relationships. The first 
is the relationship between SFODA commanders and the SF commander and the second 
is the relationship between the SFODA commanders to the GPF battlespace battalion 
commanders.  
When discussing the relationship between SFODA commanders and the SF 
commander, the agent is the actual SFODA commander and the principal will include the 
hierarchal chain of command above the SFODA commander (AOB, SOTF, and 
CJSOTF). The AOB, SOTF, and CJSOTF commanders were steps in the hierarchy and 
provided various levels of support to the SFODA, but they can be generally treated as one 
“principal” in this discussion.  
The second relationship, SFODA commanders and GPF battlespace battalion 
commanders, will classify the agent as the actual SFODA commander and the principal 
as that GPF Battalion Commander (BC), who according to mission command guidance 
from the overall commander of all U.S. forces in Afghanistan, “owned” the battlespace 
where the SFODA operated. Although the SFODA was under no “official” command 
relationship with the GPF BC, success on the battlefield usually relied on a good 
relationship (working instead of shirking). 
4. Preferences and Information  
Starting in 2002 and apparent in 2006, the assumption of command by GPF 
increased the gap between the principal’s and agent’s preferences. Also, information 
asymmetry increased tremendously. Both the principal and agent still had a preference 
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for mission accomplishment. However, the methods to achieve such differed greatly, 
which increased the number of problems between the two.  
The agent’s preferences were still mission accomplishment, professional reward, 
and autonomy.86 Mission accomplishment was especially important because it validated 
the agent’s efforts. No one wanted to do something if it did not contribute to the overall 
war effort, especially if it was dangerous and put soldiers at risk. The SFODA 
commander’s relevant local information was characterized as the knowledge and 
understanding of a village, people, terrain, environment, and culture. The agent was the 
only person with this “special” information at that particular time in that particular 
situation so he usually knew a better or best method for the task due to his position so 
close to the actual action. Furthermore, the agent’s preference for autonomy was strong. 
The agent did not want to be micro-managed by the principal because the agent felt the 
need to change quickly, innovate, adapt, and overcome obstacles.  
In 2006, the agent had an information advantage over the principal due to his 
position on the ground. Based on that, the agent should have been granted more 
autonomy to make decisions and resources should have been allocated to him for this 
purpose. Sometimes the “special” information could have resulted in success only if the 
principal gave him autonomy. These preferences influenced the agent’s decision to shirk 
more than work. The reason for this “shirking” is the agent knew he had a better method 
or course of action based on his special information. The principal could not verify that 
information and its “worth” so the principal was incentivized to control rather than allow 
autonomy. 
The agent now gets torn between his desire for what he “knows” will bring 
mission accomplishment at his level and his preferences for professional reward. He 
values professional reward because the principal writes his evaluations and has a direct 
influence on the rest of the agent’s career. More importantly, the agent values 
professionalism and it is considered unprofessional to openly counter one’s principal. It 
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behooves the agent to align his preferences with the principal, even if it diminishes the 
value of activities on the ground that may result in “mission accomplishment.” 
The principal’s preferences started to change when GPF assumed command in 
2002. The risk tolerance of principals decreased in the years between 2002 and 2006 due 
to these changed preferences. Principals were not incentivized to risk allowing 
subordinates autonomy. Instead, they were incentivized to implement control measures to 
ensure agent preferences align with their own preferences.  
As the information gap between the principal and agent grew, the principal began 
to value various activities differently and varied how much risk (to mission and to force) 
he might assume to achieve a specific outcome. His judgment of risk changed rapidly and 
often, usually based on the judgment of risk by his own principal. 
The higher up the principal sat on the chain of command, the further he was 
removed from actual activities on the ground being conducted by the agent. Therefore, 
the “value” of the agent’s activity, while extremely important to the agent, lost its value 
the higher up the chain of command. 
Although every principal in Afghanistan wanted mission accomplishment, the 
internal-process driven “machine bureaucracy” organization of the conventional U.S. 
Army GPF hindered its progress. For example, the size of the force required control 
measures so commanders could direct young soldiers easily through clear simple rules 
and discipline. It is this way because it is structured to fight the “American way of war,” 
which is massing firepower against a symmetrical enemy.87 In a linear battlefield, 
tangible objectives are easy measurements on the road to victory. Captured terrain and 
enemy “kills” are tangible objectives that GPF like to measure because it fits with their 
mission. However, in 2002, after the Taliban defeat, the threat became unconventional. 
The GPF principals failed to adjust to this unconventional environment where the 
population is the center of gravity.88 The U.S. continued to work with large conventional 
formations, holding terrain, and using firepower against suspected enemy targets.  
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In Afghanistan, non-tangible factors like population acceptance of their own 
government are true measures of success and progress. Since these non-tangible factors 
are so hard to measure, it is no surprise that the costs and benefits are so different in this 
environment than in an environment where the enemy is seen and can be destroyed 
marking progress. An agent will want to achieve mission success and will go to great 
lengths to achieve a “success” but the principal judges that the benefit of some minor 
military activity is just not worth the cost of even one U.S. life. Therefore, since a 
“success” in Afghanistan is given such low value, the risks to achieve that “success” are 
not worth it. The principals along the chain of command feel this way so they impose 
control measures to minimize risk because any “failure” has huge political ramifications, 
which could be a single death or capture of a U.S. service member. This type of fail is 
considered catastrophic and way too dire to have any kind of benefit so a principal’s 
utility function will choose decisions that minimize risk and maintain the status quo. 
This increase in risk aversion is due to exogenous factors within the political 
nature of U.S. government and military. The political climate that exists in all levels of 
government creates risk aversion throughout the entire entity. The principal-agent 
relationship, and its problems, at the smallest unit level is a result of the principal-agent 
relationship at the highest levels of government.  
5. Monitoring and Control Mechanisms 
Even though the principal knew he should increase his risk tolerance because the 
agent’s local/private information coupled with agent initiative could be crucial for 
mission success, the principal had no incentive to do so. Therefore, the principal wanted 
to impose control and monitoring mechanisms to mitigate the effects of problems that can 
occur when the principal and agent have private information and preferences. 
In 2006, Afghanistan’s unconventional environment, the principal monitored the 
agent’s behavior through the mission approval process (concept of operations 
(CONOPs)), reporting requirements (situation reports (SITREPs)), direct interference 
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with the mission (technology and force protection requirements), and micro-managing 
the agent (punishment).89  
The large internal-process-driven GPF organization needed strong control 
measures to ensure all organizations in Afghanistan were aligned with the principal’s 
preferences for control, which was necessary to synchronize complex operations.90 The 
principal had a preference for unity of effort, which he gained by ensuring all subordinate 
units provided information on their activities using situation reports (SITREPs) and 
concept of operations (CONOPs). Senior principals wanted information and control of 
subordinates was the way to provide that information.  
These control mechanisms were due to the GPF headquarters (HQ) needing to 
satisfy its own principal’s (SECDEF) information requirements. GPF were incentivized 
to control subordinate units because they were expected to know and report on the 
subordinate unit activities. They could not let subordinate autonomy and initiative, 
flexibility, and adaptability get ahead of the GPF HQ knowledge.91 Also, smaller staffs 
near the bottom of the chain of command could not keep up with the information 
requirements and ended up spending all their time and resources gathering and processing 
“old” information to report than was spent gathering and processing “new” information to 
use in targeting the enemy.92  
Force protection requirements were another control mechanism. Armored 
vehicles were required to minimize risk to soldiers but it decreased the chances of 
obtaining surprise against the enemy. This control mechanism showed how the principal 
preferred to avoid a “failure” rather than gain a “success.” The “failure” had more weight 
than the “success” in his decision analysis. Force protection measures such as this, while 
decreasing the physical risk to soldiers and the political risk to principals, actually 
reduced the effectiveness of interaction with the population, which decreased intelligence 
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gathering. It increased the risk to mission. Intelligence was really only gathered during 
combat operations, which built mistrust among the population, which negatively affected 
mission accomplishment.93 
The CONOP approval process was another control mechanism. As part of the 
mission approval process, the agent is required to plan any activity. That plan must then 
be briefed to the principal for approval. This is one of the principal’s primary control 
measures. Since an agent is shirking when he is doing something not within the direct 
knowledge of the principal, the SF agent is shirking when he conducts some type of 
tactical action, uses different tactics or methods, that was not part of the principal’s 
approved plan. There can be many cases where the agent is working at first, but events 
unfold, and the agent ends up shirking.  
The principal had to approve any activity so in order to leave firebases and 
conduct operations, the agent would submit a CONOP for every type of operation; from 
deliberate combat operations to simply moving around outside the firebase talking to 
locals and gathering intelligence. The agent would explain exactly what he was going to 
do, including why it needed to be done, and include all risk mitigation methods for the 
activity. The “riskier” the activity, the higher up the chain of command it could be 
approved. The principal required this information so external assets could be requested 
and provided to the SFODA for the operation or activity. Synchronization between other 
units was often necessary to prevent fratricide. However, this requirement created a delay 
from when the CONOP was submitted to when the SFODA would receive mission 
approval. Furthermore, the multiple layers between an SFODA commander and the 
principal with approval authority increased the “staffing timeline.”94 
Technology was another control mechanism. Evolving technology increased the 
level of centralization because senior principals would feel like they knew exactly what 
was happening on the ground because they could watch it over a UAV feed. This 
provided a principal, who already has an incentive to control, with an opportunity to 
                                                 
93 Rothstein, Afghanistan, 111. 
94 Rothstein, Afghanistan, 110. 
 52
further micro-manage an agent. This might have created a false sense of knowledge at the 
central HQ level and led to believing that the agent might not possess any “special” 
information at all. His information advantage of local relevant information was reduced 
by such technological advances.95 
These monitoring and control mechanisms are extremely important for any type 
of military operation. CONOPs and SITREPs are designed to provide the principal help 
when allocating resources and making decisions. However, the content and level of detail 
for each demonstrated the decreasing level of risk tolerance in the organization.  
6. Analysis 
Problems occurring when preferences do not align is further complicated when 
the agent has to satisfy multiple principals. In 2006, the SFODA Commander had his own 
SF chain of command and he had a GPF BC battle-space owner. The agent might get 
conflicting information from these two principals. For example, the SFODA Commander 
might want to conduct an operation that was a high risk to soldiers. The SF chain of 
command might approve such an operation but the GPF BC might voice concerns 
(because he is not used to assuming such risk for his own subordinate companies). The 
SFODA is torn between conducting his mission, which he sees as contributing directly 
toward mission accomplishment, and succumbing to the GPF principal’s preference of 
risk aversion, which will maintain the level of “informal relations” between the two. If 
the SFODA conducts the operation, the relationship will be damaged and future 
cooperation and support will be reduced. 
This is a problem because the GPF BC is often in a position to support the 
SFODA more than the SFODA’s own chain of command. The GPF BC has valuable 
resources such as transport helicopters, attack helicopters and a quick reaction force 
(QRF) for the area of operation (AO). The SF chain of command can deliver the same 
resources but each SFODA has to compete for those limited resources. Also, both 
principals want instant information and updates, especially during a combat engagement, 
but communication assets are limited. The agent knows reporting to the GPF BC will 
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provide quicker QRF and immediate results, but he is directed to report to his SF chain of 
command. The SFODA Commander will want to do what his SF chain of command 
wants, in order to be professionally rewarded, but has more incentive to follow the GPF 
principal’s preferences due to increasing the value of his own preference for mission 
accomplishment and security. 
In 2006, SF principals were incentivized to be just as risk averse as GPF 
principals. Dismounted patrols were discouraged because principals wanted soldiers 
within support distance of mounted heavy weapons at all times. This limited a SFODA’s 
ability to maneuver against the enemy but it was within the principal’s risk tolerance. In 
Afghanistan in 2006, GPF were the dominant part of the U.S. organization and dictated 
the organizational culture. SF’s mission and roles blended into that culture. This 
contributed to the “conventionalization” of SF as most SF leaders adapted because they 
valued professional reward.96  
The situation and mission in Afghanistan in 2006 was still dynamic and complex. 
However, the principal was not incentivized to accept a large amount of risk by allowing 
autonomy for his agent. Even though the uncertain environment required flexibility, 
adaptability, and autonomy, centralized decision making was required to maintain control 
among all subordinate agents. The principal’s choice of command and control resembled 
“restrictive control” where orders are detailed and emerge from a central command. 
Subordinate commanders are expected to follow orders exactly. This rigid system ensures 
conformity among all subordinate commands and commanders. This paradigm does not 
resemble “mission command” as described in ADP 6–0 and as required in General 
Odierno’s vision where highly adaptive leaders countering indirect threats are necessary 
for the U.S. to win. SF was under “short-leash” control. However, it must be emphasized 
that Afghanistan was an anomaly for SF. SF currently operate in over 80 countries and 
those missions allow much higher degrees of discretion to junior leaders. The key take-
away is to not institutionalize the “short leash” observed in Afghanistan.  
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The tight command and control paralyzed agents’ initiative.97 Multiple layers of 
command hierarchy, coupled with increased bureaucracy and “staff processes,” created a 
highly efficient, standardized, synchronized, uniform fighting force in Afghanistan. The 
only problem was the enemy did not present himself in an orderly linear fashion on the 
battlefield. Instead, he hid among the population where only through trust and personal 
relationships with the people could the U.S. obtain the enemy’s location. Otherwise, the 
enemy attacked U.S. forces on its terms and escaped before the U.S. could counter-attack. 
IEDs and landmines quickly became favorite weapons due to their ease of use, ease to 
create, and effective results. 
The agent chooses whether to work or shirk based on his own preferences and 
how much he believes the principal will punish him for shirking. In Afghanistan 2006, 
the agent shirked under the principal’s intrusive monitoring systems.98 The principal 
intrusively monitored and controlled the agent using a wide variety of means. The agent 
shirked because his preference for mission accomplishment validated his effects on the 
ground. He knew the best way to “win” and strove for mission success. The principal did 
not value those “wins” the same and had a larger value for minimizing risk to force. The 
agent shirked anyway and knew the principal would punish him with increasingly 
restrictive and intrusive monitoring mechanisms. Overall, this was both ineffective and 
inefficient in this unconventional environment. Risk adversity places too many 
constraints on the U.S. Army organization, and in particular SF, to be effective in a UW 
environment. Commanders with no incentive to allow autonomy in their subordinates 
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punishment for shirking.  
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hinders innovation, initiative, adaptability, and flexibility, which are all critical to 
successful decentralized operations in a complex dynamic UW environment. 
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
Special Forces (SF) have become prominent actors in the recent conflicts in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. Over twelve years of warfighting, Army SF have been called upon 
countless times to conduct complex operations (including, but not limited to, killing or 
capturing high-value targets) in support of conventional “battlespace” owners. While this 
has produced a generation of SF officers with arguably the most combat experience since 
the organization’s inception, one disturbing ramification seems to be the over-
centralization of command that has been engendered in the organization in the last 
decade. The purpose of this research was two-fold. The first purpose was to introduce a 
novel set of tools from microeconomic theory to analyze the roles of risk tolerance and 
degree of centralization in optimizing organizations to their environment. The second 
purpose was to use these tools to explore the evolution of centralization within SF over 
the course of the Afghanistan conflict. The result of the analysis is to provide 
recommendations for the SF enterprise in the wake of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, 
in light of emerging guidance from senior military leadership.99 
I applied the PA model to SF units in Afghanistan in 2001 and 2006. A 
longitudinal case study of the conflict in Afghanistan showed that in 2001 SF had a “long 
leash” to allow for autonomy and flexibility, which was necessary to succeed in an 
unconventional warfare (UW) environment. However, by 2006, the leash was shortened 
and more control measures were implemented. While a “short leash” may be appropriate 
for a conventional battlefield, it negatively impacts SF effectiveness in a UW 
environment. 
Although the period in Afghanistan from 2002–2005 was extremely rich with 
various degrees of risk acceptance and risk tolerance by principals at all levels, the next 
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time period considered within this thesis is 2006, because the author has personal 
experience in Afghanistan during this time period.  
SF missions in Afghanistan in 2001 were conducted in an environment that was 
complex and unstable, which means there were many variables that affected the SF unit 
and those variables changed quickly. The SF unit was conducting its UW mission 
working with and through an indigenous force. There was a high level of risk tolerance 
by senior leaders (principals), which provided ample autonomy to the junior leaders on 
the ground (although they had no other choice). SF missions in Afghanistan in 2001 are 
an example of a “long-leash” operation. 
SF missions in Afghanistan in 2006 were also conducted in an environment that 
was complex and unstable, with many variables affecting the SF unit and those variables 
changed very quickly. The SF unit was conducting a blend of its UW and FID mission. 
There was a low level of risk tolerance by senior leaders (principals) and all missions had 
to be approved at extremely high levels. Resources were centralized and controlled by a 
senior authority and junior leaders on the ground were not provided very much 
autonomy. SF missions in Afghanistan in 2006 are an example of a “short-leash” 
operation. It is important to note that although the control measures imposed by 
principals in 2006 were required based on the environment, I focused on the problems 
imposed on the agent’s autonomy due to the principal’s lack of incentive to allow 
decentralization. Afghanistan in 2006 highlights this aspect and it is used as a case study 
because most SF leaders today have been exposed to that environment and must be 
warned not to replicate it in a future UW campaign. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Risk aversion exists in SF due to principal agent problems. Principals are not 
incentivized to risk allowing subordinates autonomy. They are incentivized to implement 
control measures to ensure agent preferences align with their own preferences. When 
these preferences do not align, problems occur. Junior officer autonomy is reduced and 
senior officer control and risk aversion is increased. There are three main reasons that 
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induce the risk aversion of principals. Those three reasons are exogenous factors, 
organizational considerations, and organizational culture. 
1. Exogenous Factors 
The first reason, and perhaps the most important reason, why risk averse 
principals are induced to instill intrusive control measures over subordinates because they 
fear subordinate autonomy, is exogenous factors within the political nature of U.S. 
government and military. The political climate that exists in all levels of government 
creates risk aversion throughout the entire entity. The principal-agent relationship, and its 
problems, at the smallest unit level is a result of the principal-agent relationship at the 
highest levels of government. Presently, it is accepted by many that the benefit of some 
minor military activity is just not worth the cost of even one life. The effects of a military 
unit’s action in Afghanistan are not tangible. People and decision makers just do not see 
it. The agent, who is on the ground and might see a benefit, only sees the benefit on a 
relative scale. The benefits to him might be great but they exponentially lose their value 
the higher up the chain of command; it just does not really matter above his level. For 
instance, during World War II, if a company of U.S. soldiers died trying to take a hill, 
that terrible lose would be considered a negative consequence of war. However, if a 
company of U.S. soldiers died in Afghanistan trying to take a hill, many decision makers, 
and most likely the general public, would question if that activity was worth losing an 
entire company. The reason for this is World War II provided many tangible objectives 
that were easy measurements on the road to victory. Each “hill” represented one more 
step toward defeating the enemy.  
In Afghanistan, however, non-tangible factors like population acceptance of their 
own government are measures of success and progress. Since these non-tangible factors 
are so hard to measure, it is no surprise that the costs and benefits are so different in this 
environment. Therefore, since a “success” in Afghanistan is so minute, the risks to 
achieve that “success” are not worth it. The principals along the chain of command feel 
this way so they impose control measures to minimize risk because any “failure” has 
huge political ramifications, which could be a single death or capture of a U.S. service 
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member. This type of failure is considered catastrophic and way too dire to have any kind 
of benefit so a principal’s utility function will make decisions that minimize risk and 
maintain the status quo. However, this choice creates stagnation and minimal progress to 
the war effort. The conflict will just go on and on until the U.S. decides to leave. The 
principal weighs the risk to force greater than the risk to mission. In the end, the agent on 
the ground, with a different perspective, can see tangible benefits from certain actions, 
and therefore might be incentivized to shirk to achieve those effects. 
2. Organizational Considerations 
The second reason that induces risk aversion among principals is organizational 
considerations, which include force deployment and chain of command. The choice of 
force when the U.S. applies military force in any conflict has huge implications for the 
risk tolerance of principals. For example, the U.S. wanted to assist the government of El 
Salvador in the 1980s as it struggled against a guerilla threat but the U.S. did not want to 
commit large numbers of soldiers to this conflict because of various political, 
bureaucratic, diplomatic, and administrative reasons. No senior principal wanted to risk 
defeat in El Salvador. Since risk aversion was high, the U.S. committed a very small 
number of U.S. Special Forces to advise the El Salvadorians. As it turns out, this decision 
helped, rather than hinder, the U.S. effort in El Salvador. Senior principals decide on the 
“force deployment” based on the outcomes they are trying to achieve. However, certain 
situations require certain organizations that are suited for that environment. If the wrong 
organization is sent into some environments, then the actions by that organization could 
exacerbate the problem instead of remedying it. If the U.S. had used one of its major 
infantry divisions in El Salvador, the results would have been completely opposite of the 
positive effects that SF achieved. The U.S. GPF “American way of war” would rely on 
massing firepower on a symmetrical enemy in a war of attrition. This would fail in that 
asymmetrical environment.100 
                                                 
100 Hy S. Rothstein, “Less is More: the Problematic Future of Irregular Warfare in an Era of 
Collapsing States,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2007), 279. 
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Another aspect of the organizational reason for risk aversion in principals 
concerns multiple layers of the chain of command. Multiple layers create all kinds of 
principal agent problems. One example of this could be when trying to define the unity of 
effort as it pertains to U.S. objectives and efforts around the world. Every activity of each 
component of the U.S. military’s Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC), along with 
each country’s U.S. Embassy Security Cooperation Office (SCO), is tied to effects and 
objectives, as articulated from the president’s National Security Strategy (NSS) to the 
GCC’s Theater Campaign Plan. There is clear command guidance within these 
documents so all leaders know what an activity should be trying to achieve. However, a 
decision maker may not know how to choose the optimal activity in a resource 
constrained environment. A synchronization of effort and activity is now difficult. 
Definitions of goals and end states are usually broad and open, so it is difficult to 
determine which activity is best. Leaders usually try to evaluate each activity to see if is 
meeting those goals. To do that, one would need some type of measures of effectiveness. 
The leader would also have to determine how the interagency fits into DOD goals and 
plans. Far too often, the leader defers to the status quo of whatever activity that is 
ongoing and has not caused any “problems” for the previous leader. This ensures success 
for career and not necessarily finding the “best” value for our effort. This risk aversion is 
counter to a leader using initiative and ideas to drive to an end state or objective. They 
should not just follow status quo, they should critically think, but few incentives exist to 
do so. A leader might not want to be creative and innovative if it does not help his career. 
He will be less likely to see a problem and identify a solution that’s “out of the box.” 
Traditional risk management in the U.S. Army focuses on the risk to mission and risk to 
force, but those risks might not be as important as risk to career, because there seems to 
be zero tolerance in today’s environment for failure. 
3. Organizational Culture 
The issues identified above that increase risk aversion of principals are not easy to 
fix. People are just responding to their exogenous political system, so it creates risk 
aversion. The strategic/political environment is to blame instead of the individual. 
However, it may be possible to fix the third reason for risk aversion in principals. The 
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third reason is organizational culture, which I describe as the current evaluation system 
utilized by the Army and the way command structures are implemented (either 
operational or administrative chains of command) create problems for principal-agent 
relationships.  
a. Officer Evaluation System 
The promotion and evaluation system is the same for the entire U.S. Army, 
regardless of any individual’s unit’s mission or purpose. Army Regulation (AR) 623–3 
outlines the requirements for the senior officer (rater and senior rater) to evaluate his 
subordinate in an annual officer evaluation report (OER). Subjective variables are used in 
the evaluation so the officer can be objectively compared to his peers. How an officer’s 
superior views him has a tremendous impact on his subjective rating, which impacts the 
way the Army views the officer in promotion and command selection boards. All officers 
are evaluated the same way for uniformity throughout the Army. While leaders will rate 
their subordinates based on how well they accomplish the unit’s mission, the fact remains 
that all are subjective assessments based on how the officer’s superiors view the officer’s 
performance. In other words, how closely the officer’s preferences match the principals. 
Furthermore, only the top 49% of rated officers can receive “above center of mass” 
(ACOM) evaluations. The rest must receive “center of mass” (COM) or “below center of 
mass.” In SF, it is extremely difficult and rare for an officer with any COMs to be 
selected for battalion command.101 Most often, an officer will receive the best mark on 
his report when his preferences align with his rater (superior). The rater and senior rater 
will evaluate the officer on how well he accomplish his duties according to his duty 
description, his performance, and how much potential he holds for the next higher rank 
and schooling requirement. This appraisal is set against his peers in the unit at that time; 
his rank among his peers that the rater and senior rater evaluate. If the rater’s preferences 
do not align and the officer is perceived as shirking, then that officer will not receive a 
good evaluation and that report will be judged by a board of senior officers that 
                                                 
101 U.S. Army Human Resources Command, “SF Branch Brief” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA, February 19, 2014). 
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determine promotions and command selection lists. Subjective criteria are used for an 
objective evaluation system. 
b. Multiple Command Structures 
Another issue that exacerbates the problem is when an officer has multiple bosses, 
which is a feature of UW more than conventional operations. Multiple principals 
contribute to the principal-agent problem where the agent decides to put forth effort into a 
different task than the principal would prefer. When an agent has multiple principals, 
those principals might each have different preferences for the most important task they 
would like the agent to accomplish. The agent now faces a dilemma where he will be 
working for one principal but shirking for another. The agent chooses his action based on 
his own preferences and his own information perspective from his position. If the agent 
chooses to shirk with his “administrative control” ADCON principal, then his OER will 
reflect negatively.102 If the agent chooses to shirk with his “operational control” OPCON 
principal, then the mission might be negatively impacted.103 A negative OER will look 
poorly to the board who decides promotion and command selection. It will benefit the 
agent to work with his ADCON principal but it might not be best for the mission.  
C. CONCLUSION 
When making decisions, military leaders always assess risk and try to mitigate 
any risk to the mission or to the force. The Army says it wants innovative leaders but it 
rewards leaders who demonstrate effective control. In today’s environment, any “failure” 
is weighed much heavier than any “success.” This puts the U.S. at a disadvantage against 
various threats. To succeed in an unconventional environment, the reward system must 
identify the leader whose action results in mission accomplishment. The incentives must 
align with the expected outcomes.104 Perhaps the system should reward abstract ideas 
like indirect long term engagement, rapport building, and interaction with host nation as 
                                                 
102 U.S. Dept. of Defense. Joint Publication (JP) 1–02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military 
and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2014), 3. 
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evaluation measures but only when they result in mission success. This could put UW 
efforts as the most important and rewarded effort. Instead, the Army’s reward structure is 
a mismatch to the behavior it wants from its soldiers, for example, such as when the 
reward system is based on number of enemy combatants killed among other things.105  
In order to change the “fear to fail” culture in SF, we must change the incentive 
system. The “zero defects” culture must be eliminated, and a culture of innovation and 
autonomy must take its place. The principal must still provide the agent education, 
training, mentorship, and resources to succeed. The principal should focus on how to best 
support the agent with money, combat systems, support, etc., instead of direct control. 
When officers fail, their “chain of command” should not necessarily be fired. This, of 
course, rules out instances of gross misconduct, which result in needless or avoidable 
deaths. I do not advocate reckless behavior. Failure in this case is meant to be “political 
and/or strategic failure” where seniors are more embarrassed by the actions of the junior. 
Perhaps the best way to mitigate the risk of strategic failure is to be very accepting of risk 
at the tactical level. I think that others will accept this as long as their seniors will grant 
them the autonomy to do their mission and accomplish their tasks without a fear of 
failure. Once we get rid of the “fear to fail” dynamic, I think junior officer autonomy will 
increase, senior officer control will decrease, and this truly networked approach will 
make SF an even more effective organization to counter the threats it faces in this 
complex and dynamic environment where it exists. 
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